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The Virginia War Office was a critical component of the Virginia government
during the American Revolution. Its duties encompassed every
aspect of planning,
,"
supplying, and waging war in the state. The Commissioner of War gathered strategic
information, superintended the state's military factories, and provided continuity between
the administrations of Governors Jefferson, Nelson and Harrison. The ability of the War
Office to execute its duties depended largely on the diligence of the Commissioner of
War and his ability to cope with problems beyond his control. Unfortunately, the trials
and tribulations of the War Office have been overlooked by historians focusing on the
luminary figures involved in Virginia's Revolutionary War efforts. This thesis examines
the effectiveness of the Virginia War Office. It faced many problems that were beyond
its control, including Virginia's economy, the constant invasions by the British, the
autonomy of local officials, and the interference of the Continental Army. Analyzing the
obstacles the War Office faced in the performance of its duties highlights its impact on
the Revolutionary War in Virginia.
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INTRODUCTION
The history of the American Revolution in Virginia has fascinated historians since
the birth of our nation. Scholars have written at length on the major events and the roles
of the founding fathers in shaping them. Virginia was fortunate to have such leaders as
George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, Patrick Henry and many others call her home.
Historians justly have focused on these men and their actions. However, these luminary
figures did not act alone. They had the help of the people and their subordinates in the
army and the government as well. In the biographies and narratives on the Revolutionary
War period, these subordinates are often given a paragraph or a footnote for their
contributions, despite playing a valuable, yet behind the scenes, role in the shaping of our
nation. This was certainly the case with the Virginia War Office.
The Virginia War Office labored under three governors during the war and was
critical in its conduct, yet historians have written relatively little about it despite the large
number of historical records it produced. In fact, entire books about the Revolutionary
War in Virginia have been written in which the Virginia War Office and its
Commissioners are barely mentioned. For example, in John Selby's The Revolution in
Virginia 1775-1783 the War Office and its Commissioners are referred to only nine
times. This is not to say the War Office was unimportant, but rather reflects on the use of
the records by historians. Selby used the documents of the first Commissioner of the War
Office, George Muter, to indict Thomas Jefferson's tenure as Governor of Virginia:
"Worst of all, [John] Brown and another key bureaucrat Commissioner of War George
Muter, were simply incompetent. Their continuance in office seriously reflects

Jefferson's capacity as an administrator." 1 It is clear from this statement that Selby views
the post of the Commissioner of War as "key," but he never explains why. Selby further
suggests the importance of the War Office when writing about the expansion of executive
power by the Virginia Assembly during Thomas Nelson's term as Governor of the
Commonwealth: "In addition, the assembly granted the commissioner of war powers
over other agencies of government that for practical purposes rendered him a prime
minister of war."2 Selby insinuates that the War Office became the second most
powerful post in the Commonwealth, yet he declines to provide any further analysis.
While Selby's book offers a great political and military narrative of the war in Virginia, it
contains little analysis of the War Office, and only alludes to its importance.
Emory G. Evans, the biographer of Thomas Nelson, also danced around the
subject of the Virginia War Office. He, at least, offers some explanation as to the general
purpose of the War Office:
The problem of supply was even more difficult. Responsibility for coordinating
and carrying out the supply function was in the hands of the War Office. All
State Quartermasters and Commissaries, as well as the State Clothier and the
Commercial Agent, reported to that office. Fortunately its direction was in the
competent hands of William Davies....3
Evans partially explained the function of the War Office, and offered his opinion
on the conduct of William Davies, the second Commissioner of War. Evans, however,
takes the subject no further than stating tliat "Nelson was fortunate to have William
Davies as Commissioner of the War Office" because Davies carried out his duties "with
1

John Selby, The Revolution in Virginia 1775-1783 (Williamsburg: The Colonial Williamsburg
Foundation, 1988), 263.
2

Selby, Revolution, 284.

Emory G. Evans, Thomas Nelson of Yorktown: Revolutionary Virginian (Williamsburg: The
Colonial Williamsburg Foundation, 1975), 107.
3

2

admirable efficiency."4 Jefferson biographer, Dumas Malone, barely acknowledges the
War Office in his treatment of Jefferson's time as governor. He refers to both
Commissioners of War once and suggests that Jefferson's poor showing as governor had
more to do with the failure of government agencies than Jefferson's leadership.5
Unfortunately, Malone omits which government agencies in particular are to blame. He,
like many other biographers of Jefferson, chooses to bypass an examination of the
Virginia government agencies and instead focuses on Jefferson's leadership. The truth of
the matter is that most historians who mention the Virginia War Office and its
commissioners do so only in passing. Most of their comments center on the personalities
of the commissioners and not the War Office's role.
Other than John Selby, only a handful of historians have offered an opinion on the
significance of the War Office and its Commissioners. A prime example is found in
Harry Ward's and Harold Greer's book, Richmond during the Revolution 1775-1783:
The most important office of the revised war administration was that of
Commissioner of War. George Muter proved inefficient and Col. William Davies
replaced him on March 22, 1781. Davies, the son of the Great Awakening
Divine, Samuel Davies, was a superb administrator and perhaps the ablest man in
the Virginia government. As Virginia's Commissioner of War, he directed all
facets of the war effort. 6
Again, authors allude to the importance of the War Office, yet they do not deliver
any more substantial analysis of the subject. Ward and Greer quickly summarize the

4

Emory G. Evans, "Executive Leadership in Virginia 1776-1781: Henry, Jefferson and Nelson,"
in Sovereign States in an Age of Uncertainty, ed. by Ronald Hoffman and Peter J. Albert (Charlottesville:
University Press of Virginia, 1981), 220-221.
5

Dumas Malone, Jefferson and His Time (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1948), vol. I,
Jefferson the Virginian, 368.
6

Harry M. Ward and Harold E. Greer, Richmond During the Revolution 1775-1783
(Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1977), 94.
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duties of the War Office and lavish praise on Davies without giving any indication as to
how they formulated their conclusion. They are not alone in praising the War Office and
Colonel William Davies in particular. John McBride's dissertation, "The Virginia War
Effort: 1775-1783: Man Power Policies and Practices," goes even farther than Ward and
Greer. He provides the strongest statement in favor of the War Office of any historian
that has touched on the subject:
One can argue that only the fact that William Davies was an excellent
administrator who was willing to assume responsibility that properly belonged to
the Governor enabled the state to retain a modicum of control over its military
affairs. Davies took charge of the War Office about 3 months before Jefferson
left office, provided the essential continuity between two administrations and
perhaps deserves much of the credit which is generally given to Nelson,
particularly with respect to the collection of supplies and provisions. 7
McBride's powerful statement leaves us wanting for more information on the
Virginia War Office. His topic is sufficiently narrowed to include only a small part of the
War Office's duties and therefore he only offers a few brief comments on the office.
These comments, however, leave an impression of the importance of the War Office. It
is clear that McBride has utilized records related to the Virginia War Office in his
analysis of Virginia's militia laws and their application. Otherwise, he would not be able
to make such a bold statement about the Commissioner of War. Unfortunately, McBride
did not devote more time and space in his study to expand on the role and importance of
the Virginia War Office. In fact, no detailed study of the Virginia War Office exists even
though extensive records were left behind by that office.
While secondary sources specific to the Virginia War Office are virtually
nonexistent, there are extensive primary sources directly related to it. The Library of
7

John David McBride, "The Virginia War Effort: 1775-1783: Man Power Policies and Practices,"
(Ph.D. diss., University of Virginia, 1977), 328-329.

4

Virginia is the natural launching point for any study involving Virginia history and its
collections hold many primary sources related to the Virginia War Office. The
correspondence ofthe civilian and military leaders during the American Revolution
contain many letters from and to the Commissioners ofWar. The Governors ofVirginia,
in particular, were in constant contact with their primary military advisor during the war.
The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, edited by Julian P. Boyd, contains hundreds ofletters
between Governor Jefferson and both Commissioners ofWar. Governors Thomas
Nelson and Benjamin Harrison also had extensive communication with the Virginia War
Office as illustrated in the third volume ofthe Official Letters ofthe Governors ofthe
State ofVirginia, edited by H.R. Mcilwaine. Most ofthese letters come in the form of
instructions to the War Office or in response to questions posed by its Commissioners.
The Governors were not the only high ranking officials to exchange letters with
the Virginia War Office. The Continental Officers serving in the Southern War
Department also produced a large amount ofcorrespondence with the War Office. The
Papers of General Nathanael Greene, edited by Richard Showman and Dennis Conrad,
contain many communications with the Virginia Government and the War Office in
particular. General Greene, the commander ofthe Southern War Department, constantly
dealt with the Virginia government and Colonel William Davies, in particular. When
Greene left for the Carolinas to assume control ofthe Continental forces there, he left
General Baron von Steuben in Virginia. The Baron's correspondence, collected by the
New York Historical Society and edited by Edith von Zemensky, is overflowing with
letters addressing every aspect ofthe war in Virginia. The Baron worked very closely
with the War Office and its commissioner William Davies. As a result of Lord
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Cornwallis's invasion and eventual entrapment at Yorktown, letters to and from the War
Office can be found in the correspondence ofGeneral Marquis de Lafayette and General
George Washington. The list ofofficers and minor state officials who dealt with the War
Office is too numerous to cite, but suffice it to say that the Library ofVirginia has all of
these records and more. Luckily, one does not have to rely exclusively on the papers of
other notable historic figures to piece together a record ofthe Virginia War Office.
As a state agency, the Virginia War Office produced its own records which are
collected at the Library ofVirginia. Most ofthese records can easily be accessed by
microfilm and provide volumes ofinformation on the daily operation ofthe War Office.
The most important ofthese primary sources are the War Office Records, which contain
the War Office Letter Books and the Executive War Office Letter Book. These books
include copies ofthe letters sent by and received in the War Office for the years of1780
to 1782. These collections ofletters provide a unique look into the daily conduct ofthe
war in Virginia and the operation ofthe War Office in particular. There is also the
Virginia War Office Letter Book 1779-1781 which contains a fragmented look at the
daily operations ofthe War Office. It features an incomplete record, largely because of
the loss ofmost ofthe records during to Benedict Arnold's sacking ofRichmond and the
Westham foundry in 1781. The bulk ofthis primary resource deals with the aftermath of
Arnold's invasion and the subsequent removal ofthe first Commissioner ofWar.
Another primary resource, the Journal ofthe War Office, includes daily entries ofthe
business ofthe War Office. The minutes ofthe journal help fill in some gaps in the War
Office Letter Books. There are other unpublished manuscript collections relating to the
War Office in the Library ofVirginia, such as the records ofother agencies like the

6

Public Store and Commercial Agent. Many other documents relating to the War Office
can also be found in the Calendar of Virginia State Papers and Other Manuscripts edited
by William Palmer. There is an abundance of primary source material on the War Office
that can be easily accessed and has been used by many historians on other projects. With
this plethora of information, it is unclear why no one has attempted a more in-depth study
of the Virginia War Office.
This thesis will provide a comprehensive analysis of the Virginia War Office
during the American Revolution. A study of the War Office must start with its origin
and, therefore, with the legislation that created it. This thesis will explore the reasons for
the creation of the War Office and its legislative evolution into one of the most powerful
agencies in the Commonwealth of Virginia. It will also discuss the War Office's
legislative demise near the end of the war as the Virginia General Assembly began to
shrink the government in cost-saving measures.
The second part of this thesis will examine the lives of the men who worked in the
Virginia War Office. The personalities and qualifications of the two Commissioners of
War are directly related to the efficiency and effectiveness of the office. No study of the
War Office would be complete without examining the backgrounds of Colonel George
Muter and Colonel William Davies. Their life experiences helped to formulate the type
of Commissioner each man turned out to be, while the circumstances of war dictated how
they were judged by their peers and history.
The third chapter of this thesis will discuss the difficulties facing the War Office
in the performance of its duties. Many factors affected the ability of the Commissioner of
War to carry out his actual duties; most of these factors were completely beyond his

7

control. The circumstances of war often dictated what options the War Office had and
what it could do. Virginia was the warehouse for the Continental Army in the South, and
the constant invasions by the British certainly hampered that role. The War Office faced
many obstacles, not the least of which was the beleaguered finances of the
Commonwealth of Virginia. Military failures and defeats in the Carolinas also weighed
heavily on the War Office's planning and recruitment of soldiers. Unfortunately, it
seems the War Office had to plan and fight the war against friend and foe. Virginia's
own local officials were often at odds with the state government and worked contrary to
the wishes of the War Office. The Continental Army also frustrated the War Office's
plans with its regulations and practices. The Continentals in Virginia frequently crippled
the ability of the War Office to carry out its primary function of supply by competing for
the same resources. Finally, by examining the difficulties the War Office faced in
executing its duties, we can judge its impact on the Revolutionary War.
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CHAPTER 1:
CREATION OF THE VIRGINIA WAR OFFICE

On June 1, 1779, during the midst of the Revolutionary War, Thomas Jefferson
was elected as the second Governor of the Commonwealth of Virginia. The situation
facing Jefferson and Virginia was grim indeed. Since 1776, Virginia had supported the
Continental war effort with troops and military supplies while the fighting took place
elsewhere. The war had left the state with an exhausted treasury, rapidly depreciating
currency, heavy taxes and a dwindling military establishment. 1 In addition, Virginia was
just recovering from the shock of an incursion into the state by the British in May 1779.
Major General Edward Mathew's 1,800 men, with the support of Commodore Sir George
Collier's naval squadron, had descended on Portsmouth and Suffolk in the last weeks of
Governor Patrick Henry's term and demonstrated how vulnerable Virginia was to
invasion by burning Suffolk and capturing over 130 vessels before departing. 2 This proof
that the war had shifted toward the South forced Jefferson to realize he had to plan to
defend Virginia while continuing to support the Southern Department of the Continental
Army with troops and supplies.
Jefferson, realizing that his gubernatorial duties were too much for one man alone
to carry out, began the process of overhauling the Virginia government. At his urging,
the Assembly passed legislation in the May 1779 session creating a number of advisory

1
2

Marie Kimball, Jefferson: War and Peace 1776-1784 (New York: Coward-McCann, 1947), 51.

John Selby, A Chronology of Virginia and the War oflndependence 1763-1783 (Charlottesville:
University Press of Virginia, 1973), 36.

boards to aid the Governor and Executive Council.3 Because Virginia's war effort was
far too encompassing for Jefferson and the Council to manage effectively without
neglecting their other duties, the General Assembly passed "An Act Establishing a Board
ofWar" which created a board offive men "to superintend and manage, subject to the
direction and control ofthe Governor with the advice ofthe council, all matters and
things within the department ofwar, and all persons holding offices or performing duties
within that department." The act also assigned specific duties to the Board ofWar, such
as supervising the Commissioner ofthe Navy and appointing a Commissary ofPrisoners,
as well as visiting every magazine in the state and reporting its condition.4 The intention
ofthis act clearly was to relieve the Governor and Executive Council ofroutine military
administrative duties and to provide a source ofknowledgeable advice on technical
military matters. 5 However, the Board ofWar quickly proved to be inefficient for the
needs ofthe state and in aiding Governor Jefferson. It failed to relieve the Executive of
routine military matters because every plan or order had to be submitted to the Governor
and Executive Council for approval before taking affect.6 For example, on January 21,
1780, the Board ofWar wrote Jefferson alerting him that the state artillery officers were
requesting boots. Jefferson countersigned the letter and added that the Board should
provide the boots at their discretion. 7 Essentially, the Board ofWar became a
3

Selby, Revolution, 239.

4

William Waller Hening, comp. , The Statutes at Large: Being a Collection of All the Laws of
Virginia From the First Session of the Legislature in the Year 1619 (Charlottesville: University Press of
Virginia, 1969), 10:17-18.
5

McBride, "Virginia War Effort," 146-47.

6

Hening, Statutes, 10:18.

7

Board of War to Thomas Jefferson with reply, January 21, 1780, in Julian P. Boyd, ed., JP
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951), 3:265.
10

bookkeeping committee for the Governor and Executive Council, occasionally offering
advice based on the reports received from officers in the field. 8 The new Board of War
often found it difficult to even conduct such business because it required at least three
members to be present for a quorum. Absenteeism became such a problem that in
October 1779, the Assembly reduced the quorum by one member in the hopes that
business could be conducted with some regularity. This measure, however, did little to
improve the usefulness of the Board of War. Instead, it placed most of the burden of its
functions on James Innes, the chairman, and James Barron, formerly of the Naval Board. 9
The Board of War continued to be inefficient due to its structure and lack of authority
until April of 1780 when it disintegrated. The members of the Board of War were
opposed to moving their offices from Williamsburg to Richmond where the capital of the
state was being transferred. In a letter dated February 18, 1780, the Board of War
informed Governor Jefferson that it would be impracticable to move the Board to
Richmond in April for several reasons. It stated that the distance from seaports would
hinder supply gathering, and that it would be too difficult and expensive for the state to
move the Board and its related offices, such as the Commissary of Stores. The Board of
War concluded that Jefferson's only option was to allow the Board to stay in
Williamsburg or to abolish it entirely. 10 Governor Jefferson took advantage of the move
to Richmond to eliminate the troublesome Board of War by simply allowing it to
disintegrate. Both Innes and Barron performed their duties until April 7, 1780, the last

8

Selby, Revolution, 240.

9

Ibid., 241.

10

Board of War to Thomas Jefferson, February 18, I 780, in JP, 3:297-98.

11

day Williamsburg was the official capital of Virginia. Governor Jefferson and the
Council then assumed the duties of the Board ofWar.11 The Board had been a failure and
the problem it was intended to alleviate still existed and required another remedy.
In the May 1780 session, the General Assembly ordered that General Thomas
Nelson Jr., Mann Page, Jr., Bolling Starke, George Lyne, James Innes and Robert Lee
form a committee to propose a bill to repeal the act establishing the Boards ofWar and
Trade and to appoint a Commissioner ofthe Navy, a Commissary of Military Stores, and
a Mercantile Agent. 12 On Wednesday June 14, 1780, Starke presented the bill before the
House entitled "An Act to repeal an Act establishing a Board ofWar, and one other act
establishing a Board of Trade; and appointing a Commissioner of the Navy, a
Commissary of military stores, and a Commercial Agent." The bill was read twice before
the House and then ordered to be committed to the Committee of the whole House on the
next Friday. 13 This bill marks the birth of the Virginia War Office, although it was not
specifically mentioned in the title of the act. The purpose of the bill was undoubted!y to
relieve the Governor and Executive Council of their more menial tasks. It is interesting
to note that the framers of the bill initially thought that only a Commissary ofMilitary
Stores was needed and not a Commissioner in a War Office. Perhaps, the legislators
wished to avoid the mistakes made with the Board ofWar and forego the possibility of
another body of men to bicker with the Governor and Executive Council as had happened
with the Board ofWar.

11

Selby, Revolution, 246.

12

Journal of the House of Delegates, May 1, 1780, in VGAHJ, LV, microfilm reel 331, 8.

13

Ibid., 47.

12

The bill, however, was subjected to several amendments while being considered
by the Committee of the whole House. During this period, the delegates realized that a
Commissary of Military Stores, while clearly necessary, would fail to provide the
Governor and Executive Council with the kind of aid they needed for running the war
effort. On June 29, 1780, after three days of debate, the amendments were agreed to and
the bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time. 14 The next day, the bill was
read for the third time and passed the House under the title of "An Act to repeal the Act
establishing a Board of War, and one other Act establishing a Board of Trade, and for
appointing a Commissioner of the Navy, a Commissioner of the War Office, and a
Commercial Agent." Starke then carried the bill to the Senate for its concurrence. 15 This
version of the bill marks the first mention of a War Office and demonstrates that the
House clearly believed that the new office's duties would stretch far beyond those of a
Commissary of Military Stores. The Senate returned the bill on July 4, 1780 with several
amendments which the House assented to on July 6, 1780. The bill was then sent back
into the Senate where it was approved and then signed by the Speaker of the Senate and
returned to the House. "An Act to repeal an Act establishing a Board of War, and one
other Act establishing a Board of Trade, and authorizing the Governour and Council to
appoint a Commissioner of the Navy, a Commissioner of the War Office, and a
Commercial Agent" was then signed by the Speaker of the House and passed into law on
Saturday July 8, 1780. 16 The General Assembly recognized the need for a central office

14

Ibid., 66-67.

15

Ibid., 69.

16

Ibid., 74-79.
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to manage the many duties related to the state's war effort that the Governor and
Executive Council were too busy to address. The new law read:
For the purpose of introducing economy into all the various departments of the
government, and for conducting the publick business with the greatest expedition,
Be it enacted by the General Assembly, That the act entitled "An Act establishing
a board of Trade and one other act establishing a board of War," be and the same
hereby repealed; and it shall and may be lawful for the governor with the advice
of council, to demand and receive from the commissioners of the Board of War
and of the Board of Trade, all records, papers, vouchers, and other documents
which shall belong to the commonwealth, and which have been heretofore in the
custudy or keeping of the said boards, and upon receipt thereof, to grant all and
every of the commissioners such full and proper acquittances or indemnifications
for, or an account of their transactions during their continuance in office as shall
seem just and reasonable, and to dispose of such records and papers, in such a
manner as they shall think proper. And that the business which was heretofore
conducted by the boards of war and trade, may be executed with the greatest
expidition, Be it enacted, That a commercial agent, a commissioner of the navy,
and a commissioner of the War Office, be appointed by the governour with advice
of council. The said officers shall be under the control and direction of the
governour and council, and discharge the several duties which shall be by
executive adjudged to appertain to their respective offices, to whom they shall
from time to time be amenable for their good conduct, and by whose direction
they shall act in their several functions. 17
This act represented an improvement over the Board of War Act in many ways.
By strengthening the ability of the Executive to manage its branch of the government, the
General Assembly sought to alleviate the problems that the Board of War had caused. Its
first improvement was to streamline the chain of command from an unwieldy Board to
that of a single Commissioner. Furthermore, while the Board of War Act called for the
General Assembly to appoint the members of the Board, the War Office Act allowed the
Governor and Executive Council to select the individual they deemed suitable for the role
of Commissioner. This clause was included in the legislation to ensure that the Executive
would not be at odds with the new Commissioner. The Governor and Executive Council
17

Hening, Statutes, 10:291-92.

14

could now only blame themselves ifthey chose a Commissioner who would spend more
time bickering with them than running the war effort, as the Board ofWar had done. 18
The War Office Act also allowed the Governor and Executive Council to assign the
powers and duties ofthe Commissioner ofthe War office as well as the Commissioner of
the Navy and the Commercial Agent. This fostered the division ofresponsibilities rather
than loading them all on the back ofthe Commissioner ofthe War Office, as had been
done with the Board ofWar. Under the previous act, the Board ofWar was responsible
for all military or war matters and had supervisory powers over the Commissioner ofthe
Navy. This meant that the Board ofWar was faced with the overwhelming task of
conducting the war on land and sea. Under the new act, the Commissioner ofthe War
Office had responsibility only for the land forces while the Commissioner ofthe Navy
managed all ofVirginia's naval matters.
Although the new War Office Act marked an improvement over the Board ofWar
Act, it still suffered from the greatest weakness ofthe old law. Under the Board ofWar
Act all actions ofthe Board had to be approved by the Governor and Executive Council
before being implemented. This provision had rendered the Board virtually powerless
and reduced it to the role ofa clerk. Unfortunately, the War Office Act retained this
check on the autonomy ofthe Commissioner ofthe War Office. The Commissioner had
to act under the direction ofthe Governor and Executive Council, which meant that he
was required to have their approval before implementing any plans. The only difference
between the two acts in this respect was that the Commissioner ofthe War Office could
respond more promptly to instructions than the Board ofWar, which required a quorum
18

McBride, "Virginia War Effort," 148.

15

to be present in order to conduct business. The General Assembly had scrapped a board
of clerks for a single official and allowed the Governor and Executive Council to decide
his duties and powers. Consequently, the new Commissioner of War had virtually the
same duties and powers that the Board of War had possessed. He was to act like an
adjutant general to the Governor and supervise all the departments in the state military
service including the Quartermaster, Commissary General, Commissary of Military
Stores, State Clothier General, and Commercial Agent. The new Commissioner was also
responsible for the military public works, such as the state tannery and the state
laboratory. The only real difference in the Commissioner's powers from those of the
Board of War was that he did not superintend the Commissioner of the Navy.
The law creating the Commissioner of the War Office remained unchanged until
the May 1781 session of the General Assembly. In the time that elapsed from the
creation of the War Office and the May 1781 session of the General Assembly, Virginia
suffered serious setbacks in its war effort. Almost all of the Virginia Continental
Regiments were captured at the siege of Charleston and Colonel Abraham Buford's
detachment was destroyed at Waxhaws in May 1780. These events forced Virginia into
recruiting and equipping more Continental Regiments, only to see them obliterated in the
Battle of Camden in August 1780. Virginia lost two armies in the span of three months.
To further compound these setbacks, Virginia was invaded in October 1780 by General
Alexander Leslie, in December 1780 and January 1781 by the traitor, Benedict Arnold,
and in April 1781 by General William Phillips. Virginia's lack of preparedness to
repulse the British reflected seriously on the Commissioner of the War Office and his
efforts to keep Virginia in a sound military state. When Lord Cornwallis and Benedict

16

Arnold completed a juncture of their forces in Petersburg on May 20, 1781, it became
clear to the General Assembly that stronger legislation was needed if Virginia was to
continue to survive as a state. So in the May 1781 session, the General Assembly began
crafting legislation to strengthen the powers of the Governor and the Commissioner of
the War Office.
On June 15, 1781, the House of Delegates, meeting in Staunton, ordered Mann
Page, Jr., Benjamin Dulaney, and William Campbell to prepare and bring in a bill to
regulate the department of the War Office. Mann Page, Jr. presented the bill before the
House of Delegates, which ordered it to be committed to the Committee of the whole
House. 19 The bill to regulate the department of the War Office was debated on June 20,
1781, and several amendments were added until it was finally ordered to be read a third
time and engrossed. On June 21, 1781, the House of Delegates passed "An Act to
regulate the Department of the War Office" and ordered it carried to the Senate for its
concurrence.20 The Senate wasted no time in considering this bill and added their own
amendments before sending it back to the House. The House, on June 22, 1781, assented
to the Senate's amendments and the bill was signed into law on June 23, 1781.21 "An Act
to regulate the Department of the War Office" was intended "to invest the Commissioner
of the War Office with more ample powers, and more expressly to define his duty" and it
did just that.22
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Whereas the act creating the War Office had left the Commissioner's duties up to
the definition of the Governor and Executive Council, the regulatory act precisely defined
them. The Commissioner now had the power to demand and receive returns relating to
military affairs from all public offices, which could aid him in accurately reporting the
state's situation to the Governor and Assembly. 23 Under the previous act, it was assumed
that the Commissioner of the War Office would gather information for the benefit of the
Executive, but there was no law requiring the several departments to comply with the
requests of the Commissioner of War. Because the Commissioner lacked any means of
coercing the various department heads into complying with his requests, information
.
o flen was never transm1tted to h"1m. 24
Under the new regulatory act, the various departments within the Department of
War were now required by law to provide timely returns to the Commissioner. The
Quartermaster General was required to submit a return every three months which
included all the stores in his department and exact accounts of all forage collected by his
department. In addition, he was to report the quantity and quality of magazines with the
types of stores he had in his care, as well as accounts of his transfers and issues to
Continental agents. The Commissary General was required to furnish quarterly returns
detailing what military stores were received and which counties met their quota of
supplies. The State Clothier or Subclothier also had to make returns to the War Office of
his receipts and issues. The Commercial Agent, the man who replaced the Board of
Trade, was to issue quarterly returns to the War Office detailing the amount of tobacco
23
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and taxes raised to purchase goods that the state's war machine needed. The Commissary
of Military Stores was also required to file returns detailing the state of his department, its
magazines and laboratory. He was also responsible for reporting all of his issues to and
receipts from state and continental agents. Last but not least, the Commissioners of the
Specific Tax and Provisions were required to send in quarterly returns of all tax-levied
supplies collected and issued.25 The new regulatory act also made it clear that the
Commissioner of the War Office was to act as an Adjutant General's Department for the
state. In other words, all orders concerning the military in Virginia given by the
Executive were to be issued from and recorded in the War Office.
The new law did not merely direct that the Commissioner of the War Office was
to act like an Adjutant General, but it defined some of those duties. For example, the
Commissioner was to keep a roster for the regulation of militia duty and a register of
militia officers with rank included. These militia officers were to submit semi-annual
returns of the strength of their corps and the number and condition of their arms. The
Commissioner of War was also required to keep descriptive lists of all recruits, deserters,
and militia delinquents, as well as the proceedings of all courts martial. Lists of the
Virginia Continental Regiments and state regiments detailing the rank of officers and
strength of the corps were also to be kept in the War Office. The new act gave the War
Office the power to issue all commissions to the Continental and militia officers after
they were signed by the Governor and attested to by the Commissioner of War.26
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All the powers so far defined in "An Act to regulate the Department of the War
Office" were designed to improve the Commissioner's ability to carry out the War
Office's prime mission, which was to provide military information to the Executive. The
act, however, also gave the Commissioner of the War Office expanded powers beyond
those of simple information gathering. He was given the authority to "Superintend the
establishment of magazines, regularity of issues, and shall in general direct and manage
all matters and things within the department of war, as well as all persons holding offices
or performing duties within that department."27 The General Assembly had finally given
the Commissioner of the War Office the autonomy his position required. The regulatory
act contained no restraining clause dictating that the Commissioner could only act under
the direction of the Executive, as had the Board of War Act and the Act creating the War
Office. The Commissioner of War was empowered to act independently in the
management of Virginia's war effort. He was, however, limited by being second in
command to the Governor and Executive Council. The Governor was the supreme
commander of the Commonwealth of Virginia and the Commissioner was still subject to
his orders and could not countermand them on his own authority, but the War Office
relieved the Executive of the burden of routine military matters on a daily basis.
Through the various acts creating and modifying the Virginia War Office, one can
see the evolution of the office and the potential it had to impact Virginia's war efforts.
The War Office started out as a simple continuance of the Board of War with a few
notable changes and ended up as the second most powerful office in the Virginia
government. One historian, in referring to the Commissioner of the War Office, noted
27
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that "An Act to regulate the Department of the War Office" had "for practical purposes
rendered him a prime minister ofwar."28

28 Selby, Revolution, 284.
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CHAPTER 2:
THE COMMISSIONER OF THE WAR OFFICE
The creation of the Virginia War Office and its alteration into a powerful
component of the executive branch was certainly a legislative odyssey. The necessity of
the office was evident to everyone, but required much trial and error to implement. The
transformation of the Virginia War Office was driven by several factors. The
temperament of the politicians and the fortunes of war definitely played major roles. The
other key ingredients in the transformation, however, were the men who held the post.
Their skills and personalities were the driving force behind the changes to the laws
governing the office and its overall effectiveness. An examination of the War Office
must therefore include an analysis of these men.
During its existence two men held the post of Commissioner of the War Office.
The first, Colonel George Muter, was officially appointed on July 17, 1780. 1 Before the
war, Colonel Muter had been a lawyer, whose practice ranging from Richmond to the
Chesapeake Bay, had allowed him to accumulate substantial property holdings in several
cities as well as a number of slaves.2 In January 1767, Muter advertised in the Virginia
Gazette a Portsmouth lot with a "good storehouse, quite new, and also a negro woman,
who is a good cook, & negro man, and large boy, both of which are used to work on ships
and go by water." The advertisement concluded by revealing that Muter would accept
credit until June, which suggests that he could afford to wait for payment.3 In addition to
his Portsmouth holdings, he also owned land or resided in Richmond and Norfolk. Later
1
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in 1767, Colonel Muter advertised again in the Virginia Gazette for a runaway slave
named Will, who could be returned to either Alexander Mccaul in Richmond or Henry
Tucker in Norfolk, who were acting as Muter's agents in those cities.4 By 1775, Muter
was seeking to rent some ofhis Richmond property. In an advertisement in the Virginia
Gazette, he listed a tenement across from Mrs. Younghusband's Tavern that could serve
as a tavern or a house for two families. The tenement was said to be in good condition
with a large garden and a stable for twelve horses.5 Muter had little use for the residence
during 1775, since he was currently involved in military duty at Williamsburg.
At some point during the latter half of 1775, Muter began his military career,
perhaps serving in one of the many volunteer corps about Williamsburg. The earliest
record ofMuter's service appears in the December 13, 1775, Virginia Gazette. "General
Orders" were issued from "Headquarters, Williamsburg, November 19, 1775," in which
all the troops quartered in the city of Williamsburg were ordered to be guarded in their
conduct to all Americans. The "General Orders" were signed "George Muter, Sec'ry,
C.C." and given to the paper by the Mayor of Williamsburg, who received them from
Colonel Henry.6 Muter's first military experience in the patriot cause was as a secretary
to the acting Commander in Chief of Virginia's military forces. He probably continued
in those duties until March 16, 1776, when the Council of Safety appointed him a Captain
in the state navy. Muter was later reappointed by Governor Henry on July 16, 1776 to
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command the Hero.7 He remained in command of the Hero, a ninety-foot galley made of
oak, with yellow pine decks, that carried two cannons and a crew of fifty, until he
resigned in late 1777 to enter the newly-raised Virginia State Artillery Regiment. 8 Muter
was given a new commission ranking him as a Lieutenant Colonel in the Virginia State
Artillery dating from November 15, 1777. 9 On November 21, 1777, the Virginia Gazette
announced the appointment of Lieutenant Colonel Muter and the other field officers of
the Virginia Artillery Regiment. Upon hearing of their appointments, their former
subordinates at Hampton fired the cannon located at Little Scotland and from the deck of
the Hero in honor of their commanders. 10 Lieutenant Colonel Muter and the other
officers of the Virginia State Artillery Regiment immediately set out to recruit the eleven
companies of men they would need. However, before the State Artillery Regiment could
be completed, Lieutenant Colonel Muter was given the assignment of recruiting a
separate unit in the artillery, which would become known as the Virginia State Garrison
Regiment. This assignment also promoted him to Colonel as of June 24, 1778 and
required that he enlist eight companies of infantry to man the various posts in Virginia. 11
Muter's task was to ensure that Richmond, Portsmouth, Williamsburg, Hampton, and
Yorktown had companies from his Garrison Regiment. He continued in these duties until
early in 1780 when calls for aid from South Carolina prompted Virginia to send a special
7
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detachment of state troops to the Southern Continental Army. ColonelMuter probably
had ambitions to go southward, but Governor Jefferson and the Board of War had other
plans. On February 18, 1780, Governor Jefferson, on the advice of the Board of War,
wrote to ColonelMuter and ordered him to take charge of the state's river defenses and
specifically the construction of the battery at Hood's, a key position on the James River.
ColonelMuter's troops were to be incorporated into the detachment, now under the
command ofMuter's subordinate Lieutenant Colonel Charles Porterfield, and militia
were ordered to replace them at the river defenses. 12 ColonelMuter must have been
disappointed at losing the chance to command troops in the field. Instead of going south,
he faced the tedious but extremely vital duty of constructing the battery at Hood's and
overseeing the state's other river defenses.
ColonelMuter began his new duties about the same time Governor Jefferson
decided to allow the Board of War to disintegrate. On the same day thatMuter received
his new orders, the Board of War told Jefferson that it would rather disband than move to
Richmond. 13 By April 7, 1780, the Board of War had ceased to function and laid its
duties into the lap of Governor Jefferson and his Council. Consequently, the Executive
needed to fill the void left by the Board of War or be swamped with its daily business.
Governor Jefferson and the Council alleviated their dilemma by calling on ColonelMuter
to assume the duties of the Board of War. ColonelMuter must have seemed like the
natural successor for the Board of War. He was a high-ranking officer, who had served
since 1775, and was currently overseeing the main defensive installations in Virginia. In
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addition, his duties as commander of the State Garrison Regiment had given him valuable
knowledge of the state's military complex and experience in organizing military
departments on a statewide scale. It is not clear exactly when Governor Jefferson
selected Colonel Muter to assume the duties of the Board of War; it was either shortly
before or just after the House of Delegates ordered a bill be drawn up repealing the Board
of War and replacing it with a Commissioner of the Navy and a Commissary of Military
Stores on May 12, 1780. 14 Governor Jefferson's correspondence reveals that he
unofficially appointed Colonel Muter to act for the Board of War before May 27, 1780,
nearly two months before the War Office was officially created. 15 Colonel Muter's
correspondence with the Council indicates that he may have been acting as early as
March 28, 1780, when the Council ordered him to take steps to remove framing from
Sydnor's and erect it at the foundry. 16 Although this job could be related to his duties as
overseer of Virginia's river defenses, it did not involve river defenses and fell under the
responsibility of the Quartermaster's department. It is more likely that the Board of War
was not meeting at this time and Governor Jefferson turned to the highest ranking officer
of state troops present, as he had done in the past, to take care of the matter. 17 By July 8,
1780, the General Assembly had passed the act, which abolished the Board of War and
created the post of Commissioner of the War Office. This paved the way for Colonel
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Muter's official appointment as Commissioner of the War Office. Although no
government record exists of his appointment, Colonel Muter and Governor Jefferson
considered it official by July 17, 1780. 18 In agreeing to undertake the duties of the
Commissioner of War, Colonel Muter insisted on certain conditions of service. He
demanded that he retain his rank and commission in the state troops, as well as all the
rights and emoluments associated with it. This included half pay for life and land grants
that were due to all officers serving honorably in the state forces. Colonel Muter, in
exchange for his demands, voluntarily agreed to give up his current pay, rations and
forage privileges in lieu of the salary he would obtain as Commissioner of the War
Office. 19 The exact amount of salary Colonel Muter received is unknown, but it was
certainly less than 40,000 pounds of tobacco per annum, as that was the salary after it was
raised by the act to regulate the War Office in May 1781. 20 As Commissioner of the War
Office, Colonel Muter's duties were now significantly expanded from his previous ones.
He was now the adjutant general for the Governor and had to supervise all the military
departments in the state, as well as obtain and provide any information needed to assist
the Governor in making command decisions. In essence, he had the powers of the Board
of War, but without control of the Commissioner of the Navy.
Colonel Muter began his tenure in office during an extremely difficult time for
Virginia. The state was trying to replace its Continental troops, which had been captured
or destroyed at Charleston and Waxhaws. Colonel Muter was presented with the
18
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challenge of equipping a new Continental army, while maintaining the current state
establishment. The War Office also met a series of rapid setbacks as the year progressed.
Soon after Virginia managed to provide troops for the Continental army, General Horatio
Gates led them into the disastrous Battle of Camden. The loss at Camden on August 16,
1780 meant that Virginia needed to replace yet another set of Continental troops and their
equipment. Any progress Colonel Muter had made as Commissioner of War was
effectively erased and before he could reestablish order in the war department, Virginia
was invaded.
General Alexander Leslie arrived in the Hampton area on October 20, 1780 and
found that Virginia was unable to repel his troops. The disorganized defense of
Virginia's ports caused the House of Delegates, on November 11, 1780, to order a
committee to be formed "to enquire into the business of the war department, and the
management thereof."21 Colonel Muter had only been in office for five months and his
abilities and qualifications were already questioned. Before the results of the
Committee's inquiry could be obtained, Virginia was invaded a second time. On
December 30, 1780, Benedict Arnold arrived in the Chesapeake Bay with a small raiding
force. By January 5, 1781, Arnold and his troops had marched unopposed to Richmond
and sacked the capitol. The lack of opposition to such a small force seriously reflected
upon the abilities of Colonel Muter as Commissioner of the War Office. Arnold's
invasion, which will be discussed in a later chapter, demonstrates the total lack of
preparedness of Virginia's military establishment to meet just such an invasion. As
Commissioner of War, it was Colonel Muter's duty to ensure the readiness of Virginia's
21
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defenses for such an occasion. After Arnold went into winter quarters at Portsmouth on
January 19, 1781, Virginians began to hunt for the persons responsible for the poor
showing of their military against the traitor. Colonel Muter was their first and best target.
As a result of Arnold's invasion, Colonel Muter was eventually forced to resign as
Commissioner of the War Office. On March 2, 1781, General Baron von Steuben, the
Continental commander of forces in Virginia, accused Colonel Muter of neglect of duty
and laid much of the blame for Virginia's woes on him. Colonel Muter was shocked and
outraged and responded by writing a letter to Governor Jefferson which asserted:
Major General Baron de Steuben has this day publicly accused me of having
neglected my duty, so as materially to injure the United States, & declared that he
had the proofs in his possession. Though I am conscious of having, in every
instance done my duty to the utmost of my power, yet as my character may be
injured by such a public accusation being thrown out against me, I must request
that your Excellency will be pleased to order such an enquiry into my conduct as
may set it in its true light, & that you will take such measures as you think most
proper to have the proofs the Baron alledges he has against me, produced to such
Gentlemen as you think proper to authorize for the purpose of enquiring into my
conduct. I must further beg of your Excellency that you will be pleased to direct
that I may be furnished with a copy of the proofs the Baron says he has against
me (if you think proper) as soon as may be convenient.22
It is clear by the letter that Colonel Muter believed he had served faithfully to the
best of his ability. The letter also implies that he felt that he would be vindicated by
asking for an inquiry into his conduct as Commissioner of War. Jefferson and the
Executive Council responded the same day, when the Governor declared:
The board has considered your request that they should make an enquiry into your
conduct as Commissioner of the War Office. No complaint having been lodged
with them on the subject, no prosecuter offering himself, no witness pointed out,
nor even a charge specified, they do not know that they can, either with propriety
or practicability enter on such an enquiry, the more especially as they know no
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instances themselves, in which you may be justly charged with inattention to the
duties of your Office.23
This was not the answer Colonel Muter had hoped to receive. Jefferson and the
Council had stated that they knew of no instances Colonel Muter could be charged with
neglect, but certainly did not rush to his defense. By refusing the inquiry, Jefferson
denied Colonel Muter any effective defense against Baron von Steuben's accusations.
Colonel Muter was quick to realize this harsh fact and tried to remedy it by writing to the
Baron's aide, Jonathan Walker:
Thus, Sir, the matter at present stands, no accusation has been yet (that I know of)
given into the Council, & I must still suffer the uneasiness arising from a severe
accusation being thrown out against me, in harsh terms, without an opportunity of
vindicating myself unless the Baron mentions the circumstances on which he
founds his accusation to the Supreme Executive. My request to you is, that you
will be so obliging as to apply to the Baron to transmit to the Supreme Executive
as quickly as possible, the particulars of neglect of duty which he has to lay to my
charge. This I have a right to expect he will most certainly do. Justice to the
public, as well as to me, absolutely requires it. 24
Walker, in Williamsburg, answered Colonel Muter's letter five days after it was
transmitted by responding that the Baron would file his charges with the Executive as
soon as he had the leisure time to do it. 25 Colonel Muter was left at the mercy of his
accuser's leisure until March 12, 1781. Baron von Steuben appeared before the House of
Delegates and charged Colonel Muter with neglect of duty. Steuben represented to the
House that the state had only 4,000 stand of small arms fit for duty and that the
ammunition, bombs, shells, and cannon balls were in extreme disorder. The House
responded by passing a resolution that called for a committee to be formed to confer with
23
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the Commissioner of War and look into "such shameful neglect."26 Baron von Steuben
had taken the liberty of going over Governor Jefferson's head and accused Colonel Muter
in front of the House of Delegates. Hot on the heels of the resolution of the House,
Colonel Muter received a letter from Mann Page, Jr., notifying him that the committee
would meet with him that afternoon at five o'clock in his office.27 Colonel Muter had
wanted an inquiry, but the language in the resolution suggested that the outcome was
already determined. The House committee met with Colonel Muter and issued the
following report on March 20, 1781:
In short the whole business of the War Office appears to be entirely deranged
arising from the following causes, the loss of the Papers belonging to the Office
the want of a sufficient number of Assistants and the irregular manner in which
the Business seems heretofore to have been conducted. Resolved that George
Muter Esqr. The present Commissioner of the War Office is not qualified to fill
that important Office and ought to be discharged therefrom.28
The Committee decided that Colonel Muter had not neglected his duty but was
simply unable to perform it competently. Baron von Steuben's charges had been of
neglect, but should have been based on incompetence. The Committee found that
Colonel Muter could answer few questions about the status of the state's military stores.
The loss of the War Office records during Arnold's invasion prevented Colonel Muter
from giving any answer but an educated guess. It also handicapped the primary function
of the War Office, which was to provide military information to the Governor and
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Council. In addition, the Committee discovered that Baron von Steuben's assessment of
the disorderly nature of the state's military stores was accurate.29 Colonel Muter, upon
hearing of the resolution of the House, tendered his letter of resignation on March 22,
1781:
A Resolution of the Hon. the General Assembly (I am informed) has passed,
requiring that I shall be dismissed from my appointment as Commissioner of the
War Office. I am of opinion, that after having notice of such a Resolution's
having passed, it becomes improper for me to act any longer as Commissioner: I
must therefore beg leave to resign my appointment to that office, & request that
your Excellency will be pleased to give orders for the papers belonging to that
office, now in my custody, being examined & received by a proper person,
authorized for that purpose. Conscious of having ever discharged my duty, as a
Servant of the State, to the best of my power, I am enabled to bear up, under the
pressure of the Resolution of the Legislature; and I am induced to assure your
Excellency of my best exertions in the service of the State, in the station my
resignation of the appointment will immediately place me, as Colonel of Infantry.
I shall think myself honored by your Excellency's commands, and with pleasure
and alacrity obey them. 30
Governor Jefferson and the Council accepted it and immediately dispatched a
letter to Colonel William Davies desiring to know if he would accept the appointment of
Commissioner of the War Office.
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After his resignation, Colonel Muter wished to return

to his old duties as commander of the Virginia State Garrison Regiment, but due to the
arrangement of the State Regiments on February 6, 1781, he was left without a command.
Colonel Muter was mustered out of service on April 1, 1781.
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He was still willing,

however ' to serve his state. He notified Colonel William Davies, the new Commissioner
of War, on May 5, 1781 that he was retiring to Albemarle County to reside with Colonel
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John Coles, but would gladly serve again ifhe were honored with a command.33
Colonel Muter would never again command troops for the state of Virginia. After the
war had ended, he removed to Woodford County, Kentucky and started a new law
practice, which would eventually lead to his election as ChiefJustice ofthe Western
District in 1785. 34 Colonel Muter remained in Kentucky until his death in May of1811. 35
Colonel William Davies, the second Commissioner ofthe War Office, began his
tenure four days after Colonel Muter' s resignation on March 22, 1781.36 Like Colonel
Muter, Davies had been a lawyer before the outbreak ofhostilities. He was the oldest son
of Samuel Davies, the Great Awakening divine, and was born in Hanover, Virginia in
1749. By 1759, his family had removed to Princeton, New Jersey where William became
the ward ofRichard Stockton after the death ofhis father in 1761. William supported
himself by reading law with Stockton and teaching grammar school until he completed
his Master ofArts at the College ofNew Jersey in 1768. Shortly thereafter, Davies
returned to Virginia and set up a law practice in Norfolk.37 By 1773, Davies had
established himselfas a prominent lawyer in Norfolk and formed a pact with other
lawyers in town. They advertised in the Virginia Gazette on December 30, 1773 that
they would no longer accept cases, save for merchant business, unless their fees were
paid up front due to the complexity ofthe law practice, the smallness oftheir fees, and
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the difficulties in collecting them. 38 In addition to his activities as a lawyer, Davies also
was interested in local politics and active in the patriot cause. He served as the secretary
of a meeting of "Freeholders, Merchants, Traders, and other inhabitants of the county and
burough of Norfolk" which issued resolutions instructing their Burgesses to call for a
Continental Congress, announcing support for the people of Boston against the
Intolerable Acts, and asking everyone to support the Continental Association.39 By
January of 1775, Davies had been elected as Secretary of the Norfolk Committee of
Observation. As part of his duties he was required to advertise the Committee's findings
in the Virginia Gazette. Whenever the Committee found a person in violation of the
Association, Davies would publish its findings which would censure the guilty party
publicly and request that people not associate with them in any way. For example,
Davies placed an ad in the Virginia Gazette on March 23, 1775, in which the Committee
censured the merchant John Brown for violating the Association by importing slaves into
the country from Jamaica and attempting to conceal it from the Committee. The slaves
were ordered to be sent back on the same ship with no other cargo.40 Davies continued
his secretarial duties in July of 1775 by acting as the Secretary of the Norfolk Committee
of Safety. He continued to place ads at the direction of the Committee, but instead of
simply pointing out violations of the Continental Association, the Committee condemned
men as traitors to the American cause. For example, on August 11, 1775, Davies placed
an ad declaring John Schaw a traitor for identifying Alexander Main to Lord Dunmore as
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a fifer in one of the volunteer companies, resulting in Main's imprisonment aboard the
sloop of war Otter. 41 Davies also handled all of the Committee's correspondence. On
July 28, 1775, he wrote to the Virginia Convention stating the position of the Norfolk
Committee on the resolution the Convention passed which called for restrictions on
exporting provisions. The Norfolk Committee maintained that though it was a good
resolution, it was enacted without any warning, leaving the merchants with too many
goods on hand that would go to waste. They asked for its repeal until the merchants
could satisfy their present contracts. 42 While he continued to serve on the Committee of
Safety, Davies began to recruit a company of infantry in Princess Anne County. Davies
hoped he would be able to qualify for the rank of captain under the provisions outlined by
the third Virginia Convention on July 17, 1775 for raising troops for state defense. He
was successful and was commissioned as a captain in the First Virginia Regiment of Foot
on September 30, 1775. 43 By October 14, 1775, Captain Davies had assembled his
company, designated the fourth, and marched into Williamsburg.44 His regiment drilled
in Williamsburg under General Andrew Lewis until ordered on Aug 16, 1776 to join
Washington's army in New Jersey. Earlier in 1776, the First Virginia Regiment of Foot
had been annexed into Continental service and Captain Davies now possessed a
Continental commission instead of a state one. 45
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During his stay in Williamsburg, Captain Davies performed many regimental
duties that proved he was a well-trusted and respected officer. On May 3, 1776, he
served as President of a Court-Martial, which tried several men for various offenses
ranging from encouraging desertion to drunkenness.46 The fact that he was President of
the Court-Martial demonstrates the confidence that his fellow officers placed in him.
Captain Davies also was often asked to sign recommendations for promotions and
commissions.47 His stay in the Williamsburg camp, however, was not without incident.
On July 2, 1776, Colonel William Woodford claimed that Captain Davies and his brother
John Davies were spreading false and scandalous reports in their correspondence about
Woodford's conduct as an officer. Colonel Woodford ordered a Court oflnquiry to sit
and render their opinion on the matter. 48 Captain Davies had some cause to be
disgruntled with Colonel Woodford and may have censured him in his correspondence.
Captain Davies was one of the many freeholders of Norfolk who lost the majority of their
property in the looting and burning of that town.49 Possibly Davies held Colonel
Woodford responsible for the looting and burning the American troops visited upon
Norfolk after Lord Dunmore began his bombardment in January 1776. What is known is
that if the inquiry resulted in censure or court martial for Captain Davies, it certainly did
not affect his military career. It is clear that Colonel Woodford and Captain Davies did
not like one another at all. Later in his career, Davies wrote to George Washington
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referring to the "deep rooted aversion and I may say hatred, which General Woodford has
invariably manifested towards me ever since the campaign at Norfolk."50 Despite his
rivalry with Colonel Woodford, Captain Davies quickly rose in the ranks after the troops
joined Washington in the North.
In late 1776, Captain Davies was promoted to Major of the Seventh Virginia
Continental Regiment. It appears, however, that he never actually served with the
Seventh Regiment, as evidence indicates that he was captured following the surrender of
Fort Washington on November 14, 1776. 51 If Davies was taken prisoner, he was quickly
exchanged and back in service in two months. Major Davies was promoted for the
second time on February 21, 1777. He was given a Lieutenant Colonel's commission
with the Fourteenth Virginia Regiment in order to replace Lieutenant Colonel Richard
Meade, who was appointed to Washington's staff His new regiment, marching from
Virginia, did not arrive at Washington's camp in Morristown, New Jersey until July of
1777. Later in the year, Lieutenant Colonel Davies and the Fourteenth Regiment saw
action as part of General George Weedon's Brigade at the Battles of Brandywine and
Germantown. Davies served as the Lieutenant Colonel of the Fourteenth Virginia
Regiment until the resignation of Colonel Charles Lewis allowed him to be promoted to
Colonel and Regimental Commander on March 20, 1778.
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Davies had risen quickly in the ranks and had proven himself a competent and
able officer on many occasions. While serving in the Fourteenth Regiment, Colonel
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Davies was honored with the appointment of sub-inspector on March 28, 1778. On that
day, General Washington had given General Baron von Steuben the temporary
appointment of Inspector General of the Army. Steuben's task was to tum the American
forces into a professional army. 53 Steuben appointed five sub-inspectors, who were to
learn the manual of drills from Steuben and then teach them to the rest of the army.
Colonel Davies was obviously thought of as a highly competent officer to be chosen as
one of five sub-inspectors. His new duties meant detached service from the Fourteenth
Regiment, but he still retained nominal command. He was now responsible for drilling
all the troops and inspecting the various military posts in the northern theatre of the war.
So trusted was Colonel Davies that he was given the responsibility of inspecting West
Point, the most important military post in North America. 54 While Davies was engaged
in his sub-inspector duties, an arrangement of the Virginia Continental Regiments was
held at White Plains, New York on September 10, 1778. In this arrangement, Colonel
Davies's regiment was renumbered the Tenth Virginia Regiment and, in general, the
Virginia troops were reduced from fifteen to eleven regiments due to insufficient
manpower. Colonel Davies was issued a new commission dated September 14, 1778 as
Colonel of the Tenth Virginia Regiment. 55 He still retained nominal command of the
Tenth Regiment while on sub-inspector duty but, in May 1779, at Middlebrook, New
Jersey, another arrangement of the Virginia Regiments took place. In this arrangement,
Colonel Davies's regiment was merged with the First Regiment and ordered to go south,

53

John McAuley Palmer, General von Steuben (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1937), 151.

54

Ibid., 227.

55

Sanchez-Saavedra, Guide, 61.

38

where it eventually was captured at Charleston in May of 1780. 56 Because the Tenth
Regiment was now detached with the First Regiment, Colonel Davies had lost his field
command but still served as a sub-inspector.
After the arrangement at Middlebrook, Colonel Davies applied for and obtained a
leave of absence, and returned to Virginia to attend to his private affairs. 57 He applied for
the leave in order to survey the damage to his remaining property in Suffolk, which had
been sacked by General Edward Mathews earlier that May. While in Virginia, Davies
became aware that the General Assembly was looking for candidates to fill a position on
the Continental Board of War. He immediately wrote to General Nathanael Greene
seeking his recommendation for that position. Evidently, Davies and Greene had
previously talked about Davies taking a position on the Virginia Board of War, but now
Davies requested to serve instead on the Continental Board of War. This would allow
him to retain his rank and half pay after the war. If Greene wrote a recommendation for
Colonel Davies it has not been found, but Davies was nominated for the position on the
Continental Board of War. William C. Houston ofNew Jersey nominated him, but
Davies lost the appointment to Colonel William Grayson ofVirginia. 58
Colonel Davies remained in Virginia until he received word from General
Washington that if he wished to continue in the post of sub-inspector he would have to
join the Virginia regiments going south under the command of General Woodford.
Washington added that ifDavies's affairs were not completed and he could not join the
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troops, General Woodford was authorized to appoint Lieutenant Colonel Samuel Cabell
as sub-inspector. 59 It must have been disheartening news to Colonel Davies to serve
under General Woodford who so disliked him. Unfortunately for Davies, his situation
went from bad to worse as he later explained:
His Excellency directed me to join the Virginia troops on their march, but if it was
inconveniant to signify it to General Woodford, who was empowered to appoint
Colonel Cabell to be sub-inspector. I accordingly attended at this place
[Petersburg, VA], but found that no command in the line had been reserved for
me, that Colonel Gist without any right or justice had been given one of the
regiments, owing as I am informed to a direction from General Woodford to
exclude from the arrangement all officers serving in any of the staff departments,
I therefore availed myself of the obliging permission his Excellency has given me,
and Colonel Cabell was accordingly appointed Sub-Inspector on the 6th Post. The
post of inspector without any command in the line is by no means agreeable, but
the deep rooted aversion and I may say hatred, which General Woodford has
invariably manifested towards me ever since the campaign at Norfolk decided me
fully against serving with him, where I should be under his immediate command
and without any acquaintance or interest with the commanding General, which
could avail me against arbitrary or urtjust act of his, should he attempt any. 60
Colonel Davies's troubled past with General Woodford had come back to haunt
him. Woodford's directions at the arrangement, whether intentionally aimed at Davies or
not, had effectively relieved him of command of his regiment. With the loss of his field
command, Davies refused to serve as sub-inspector under Woodford and complained to
Washington. Washington answered Davies on April 20, 1780 that he was unaware of the
reasons for appointing Colonel Nathaniel Gist over Davies, but supposed it was from the
prevailing rumor that Davies planned to leave the service. Washington added that he had
suggested Davies to General John P. G. Muhlenberg as the proper person to superintend
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the gathering ofrecruits and levies in Virginia during the coming year. 61 Washington had
answered Davies's complaints in a manner which suggested that he would not overturn
Gist's appointment and that Davies should find a new line ofservice to pursue instead.
This was not the answer Colonel Davies was hoping for, but at least it offered the hope of
future employment in Continental service.
Colonel Davies's military career was now in a state oflimbo. He had been
suggested to General Muhlenberg as a proper officer for superintending the recruiting
service in Virginia, but the state's finances and military disasters in 1780 greatly retarded
that endeavor. He was only able to watch in horror as Charleston fell and General Gates
was defeated at Camden on August 16, 1780. He was still actively seeking a new duty
when he was called into service to organize the militia against General Alexander
Leslie's invasion ofVirginia in October 1780. Before he was called out on this new duty,
Colonel Davies had applied to Timothy Pickering to be appointed Deputy Quartermaster
for the State ofVirginia. Davies offered to serve in the post ifthe present candidate,
Colonel William Finnie, resigned or was not appointed. In a letter to Governor Thomas
Jefferson, Pickering discussed the need for a deputy quartermaster and Davies's
application:
Colonel Davies abilities are indesputable, and I do not know that his integrity is
suspected: but whether he is industrious I am altogether uninformed. It seems too
that he is ofan uneasy disposition, and less accomodating than could be wished at
a time when by every just means we should conciliate the affections ofthe people
as so much depends on their good will. Yet upon the whole, from the vast
superiority ofhis abilities, he may merit a preference to Colonel Finnie.
However, I would not whish to decide the case. 62
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Colonel Davies made a strong candidate for the position, but Colonel Finnie had
already been suggested for the job. Perhaps Davies's "uneasy disposition" prevented
Jefferson and Pickering from changing their opinion on Colonel Finnie. Judging from
Colonel Davies's actions after being appointed Commissioner of the War Office,
Pickering's worries about his disposition seem unfounded and based more on an
unfamiliarity with Davies rather than on first hand knowledge. As to Pickering's
comment on Davies being "less accomodating than could be wished," Davies's later
actions as Commissioner of the War Office show him to be a stickler for the rules, but
also demonstrated a willingness to bend them in certain situations. Before Davies got
word that Colonel Finnie was appointed, General Alexander Leslie invaded Virginia and
all available Continental officers in the state were called upon to oppose the invasion by
assuming command of the militia called out by Governor Jefferson. General Muhlenberg
immediately ordered Colonel Davies to begin arranging and drilling the militia so it could
be sent to his camp for active duty in hemming the British in Portsmouth. 63 While
engaged in this duty, Colonel Davies's military career received an incredible boost from
General Greene's appointment of General Baron von Steuben as commander in chief of
Continental forces in the state of Virginia. Steuben and Davies had become friends when
he served under Steuben as the senior sub-inspector at Valley Forge. Steuben, with the
hardy approval of General Greene, immediately appointed Davies to superintend the
recruiting service in the whole state. General Greene had left Steuben in Virginia to
speed the process of building another southern Continental army, while he went south to
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take charge of the remnants of General Gates's defeated army. Colonel Davies's new
duties were to oversee the rebuilding of General Greene's new southern army.64
Colonel Davies was placed in command of the general rendezvous at Chesterfield
Courthouse. Steuben ordered Davies to assemble and equip the new recruits as they
arrived. He was also ordered to build barracks, renovate the courthouse into a hospital
and turn the jails into magazines for the commissary and quartermaster. Under Colonel
Davies, Chesterfield Courthouse quickly became the largest and most important
recruiting and supply depot in Virginia.65
It was during this duty that Colonel Davies began to display the skills necessary to
run the Virginia War Office. He became intimately familiar with the War Office and
Colonel Muter as he tried to equip and assemble his recruits. At every tum Davies was
met with obstacles that Colonel Muter and the War Office could not overcome. When
Steuben and Davies wished to send recruits south to Greene in November of 1780, they
found that the state had no money for clothing and that the militia had used all the
available military equipment during Leslie's invasion.66 In response to this
disappointment, Colonel Davies quickly established a tailor shop using skilled recruits
and informed Governor Jefferson that he could also have deer skins dressed for
breeches. 67
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Colonel Davies's innovations at Chesterfield were still not enough to alleviate the
problems which were supposed to be handled by the Virginia War Office and the cash
poor government. The recruits still suffered from a lack ofclothing and equipment by
mid-December 1780, but Davies managed to overcome this obstacle allowing Steuben to
send off a detachment ofrecruits under Colonel John Greene to General Nathanael
Greene. 68 Colonel Davies's difficulties at Chesterfield were increased when Benedict
Arnold invaded Virginia in early January of1781. As Arnold advanced up the James
River, Steuben ordered Colonel Davies to evacuate Chesterfield Courthouse and remove
the stores and hospital. Davies quickly and efficiently evacuated Chesterfield and then
proceeded with his nearly-naked recruits to a position opposite ofWestham to aid the
state in the removal oftheir stores to the south side ofthe James River. His efficiency in
carrying out his orders prompted General Steuben to claim that he was indebted to him
on this occasion.69 As Arnold retreated down the James River after sacking Richmond,
Colonel Davies returned to Chesterfield Courthouse to reestablish the post there while
Steuben and the recruits proceeded to Petersburg. 70
Colonel Davies's duties were now even more difficult to accomplish due to
Arnold's total disruption ofthe Virginia government and War Office. Davies, however,
was quick to reconstitute his post and even add some improvements to it. The lack of
clothing was still the foremost problem, so Davies had a shoe factory built and managed
to get his tailors to put out fifty to sixty regimental coats per week. By March 18, 1781,
Colonel Davies's factories had amassed a considerable supply ofclothing to send to
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General Greene. 71 Davies was displaying a talent for administrative duties that put
Colonel Muter and the War Office to shame. Governor Jefferson was so confident in his
abilities that he requested Davies to submit a plan to clothe the Virginia troops in the
future. In a letter to Captain John Peyton, the Clothier General for Virginia, Jefferson
wrote that Colonel Davies "having been so kind as to consider the subject and furnish us
with a plan and observations on the minuter parts of the business I beg leave to
recommend them to your consideration, as they will furnish you with very useful ideas on
the details of your office."72
What is significant about Davies being asked to submit a clothing plan to the
Virginia executive is that it would properly fall under the duties of Colonel Muter and the
Virginia War Office. It suggests that Jefferson had already lost confidence in Muter's
abilities and was seeking expert help from outside his administration. Colonel Davies
was recognized as a highly efficient and able officer by his superiors and the Virginia
government. General Greene even requested Steuben to consult with Colonel Davies on
the proper forms for furloughs and discharges because Davies was "a man of great
observation and has had long experience respecting the abuses prevailing in the army and
state in this matter."73
While at Chesterfield Courthouse, Colonel Davies was finally rewarded for his
hard work with a new regiment. General Greene had ordered that a new arrangement
take place to reconstitute the Virginia Regiments, which had been annihilated in the
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previous campaign under Generals Benjamin Lincoln and Horatio Gates. Colonel Davies
was part of the Board of Officers that met at Chesterfield Courthouse to make the new
arrangement on February 10, 1781. Because over thirteen hundred men were still
captives in Charleston, the arrangement was mostly on paper only. Its purpose was
essentially to determine the seniority of individual officers within the Virginia continental
service. The arrangement, however, did create one new regiment and re-designate
another. 74 Colonel Davies was the recipient of the command of the newly-created First
Virginia Regiment on February 12, 1781. He had finally regained the field command
denied him by General Woodford's arrangement of the regiments.75 The Ninth Virginia
Regiment was renumbered to be the Seventh and the rest of the Virginia troops,
consisting of the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Eighth regiments, contained
prisoners and existed on paper. 76 Colonel Davies' s new regiment also existed on paper
only and consisted of himself and other officers who had escaped capture at Charleston.
The plan was to recruit the First Regiment and send it on to Greene. 77
Although Colonel Davies seemed to fare well in this new arrangement there were
other problems. It seems that General Weedon, who had resigned in 1778 over a dispute
in rank, was ordered to be included in the new arrangement and a number of officers, led
by Colonel Davies, believed this was unfair. 78 Davies addressed several letters to
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Greene, Steuben, Washington, and Congress outlining the reasons the officers opposed
General Weedon's inclusion in the Virginia continental service. In a letter to Steuben,
who was presiding over the arrangement, Davies wrote that General Weedon had been
retired under unusual circumstances for three years while the rest of the officers included
had continued to serve. Davies also maintained that the many changes in the
organization of the army would make Weedon's inclusion troublesome. Davies's last
reason probably strikes more to the heart of the Board of Officers' concerns. There now
existed within the Virginia Continental service enough officers with more experience
than Weedon who deserved promotion, if there were to be another general in the Virginia
service. 79 Colonel Davies would have certainly been one of the men eligible for
promotion to general, and was known as an ambitious officer. It is important, however,
to note that Colonel Davies and the other officers on the Board made it known that they
had nothing personal against General Weedon and even sent him a copy of their
grievances so everything would be in the open.80 In his letter to General Greene, Davies
mentioned other occasions when officers in similar situations had been denied inclusion
and that the Board based their opinion on "impartial justice."81 General Greene
responded to Davies's letter on March 30, 1781, stating that he disagreed with the Board
on Weedon's situation and maintained that general officers belonged to the Continent at
large and not to a particular state. Greene also added that Weedon's situation was
misunderstood and when he resigned it had been in good standing and the fault lay with
Congress's inability to delegate powers to alter the standing of officers of the same grade.
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This was not the answer Davies desired, but Greene ended his letter by conveying he
would leave it up to Congress and Washington to decide the matter. 82 Davies replied to
Greene that although General Weedon's standing as an officer was different from the
inferior ranks, the state's quota of troops determined the number of general officers.
Since the quota was reduced, so should the number of general officers. He argued that
the real point was that "the long absence of any officer from service on account of private
resentments or private business, ought to be a sufficient bar to his resumption of his
former command."83 Despite Colonel Davies's and the Board of Field Officers' attempts,
General Weedon was included in the arrangement due to Washington's referring it to
Congress, which took no action on the matter. It seems that Colonel Davies and the
Board of Officers let the matter drop once they realized that no action was going to be
taken in their favor. Colonel Davies must have been disappointed, but he did not let that
affect his working relationship with General Weedon. In fact, their correspondence
indicates a good working relationship and a high respect for the abilities and opinions of
each other. 84
While Colonel Davies was busy with the arrangement and his duties at
Chesterfield Courthouse, Colonel Muter and the War Office were suffering the political
fallout from Benedict Arnold's invasion. Colonel Muter was being investigated by a
special committee, which delivered its report on March 20, 1781. The result of the report
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was a resolution passed in the House of Delegates for Colonel Muter to be discharged.
The Senate made it official on March 21, 1781.85 On that same day a group of gentleman
visited Colonel Davies at Chesterfield Courthouse and requested that he offer himself as
a candidate for the post of Commissioner of the War Office. Colonel Davies
immediately wrote to General Steuben for his opinion on the matter and requested that
"this application may be secret and confidential." Colonel Davies was interested in the
prospect of holding the office and thought he could be "of use in it" and that the War
Office could "use my endeavors."86 Before Steuben could reply to Davies's letter,
Colonel Muter resigned as Commissioner of the War Office. Governor Jefferson and the
Council received Muter's resignation on March 22, 1781 and immediately dispatched a
letter to Colonel Davies appointing him to the post.87
Governor Jefferson wrote Davies that the Council had appointed him to succeed
Colonel Muter and that they would do all in their power to persuade him to take the post.
Jefferson ended the letter with a plea to Colonel Davies writing that "in the mean time I
hope it will be in your power to come immediately to the office, as its duties are such as
to admit of no intermission and impossible to be executed by the Executive in addition to
their other duties."88 Jefferson and the Council were desperate for Colonel Davies's help.
Colonel Davies was eager for the position on the flattering terms that it was offered, but
would have to receive the permission of his immediate superiors in order to accept. On
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March 23, 1781, Colonel Davies wrote General Steuben to solicit his permission to act in
the office:
In my last I mentioned to you that application had been made to me respecting the
post of Commissioner of the War Office. I observed that I thought I might
probably be of some use in it, and that if you approved of it I would be glad of
your interest in the matter. Since I wrote I have been informed of Colonel
Muter's resignation, and have this evening received a very polite letter from his
Excellency the Governor informing me that the Executive had appointed me to
that office, and requesting to know whether I would accept of it. In answer I have
accepted it conditionally, alledging that as I was under your immediate orders, I
could not leave this post without your particular permission, and that as I
belonged to the service of the continent more immediately, I could not therefore
accept the appointment determinately, untill I could obtain the permission of
Congress or the Commanding General, as I could not think of giving up my
commission and rank in the army with all the emoluments allotted, tho' at a
distant period, for the officers; and after having spent the most valuable part of
my youth in the service of my country, to throw myself into a state of dependance
upon an office, which the next session of Assembly may entirely abolish. Aware
of this inconvenience his Excellency without sollicitation is kind enough to say
his endeavors shall not be omitted to obtain every permission from the
commanding officer or other person which may be necessary to reconcile my
acting in that office to the reservation of any other interests I may wish to retain.
Under these circumstances I would beg your permission in the first instance, and
your interest in the next with Congress and the Commanders in chief, that I may
be allowed to act in this department, as long as my services can by any means be
dispensed with in the field. I would wish to have it in my power to act in the
field, whenever it should be necessary, and I would wish too, to have the
allowance of half pay & land and reimbursement for depreciation which all other
officers have; but if I lose my commission by accepting this appointment, I shall
of course be deprived of all those privileges and advantages. I do not mean,
however, to ask any pay from the continent while I act in the war office but only
to be put on the same footing that the members of the board of war were in
Philadelphia as expressed in the resolution of Congress of the ih of July 1779,
which allowed them to hold their rank in the army, but to be paid only as
commissioners. There are many precedents on the continent in favor of my
request. General Clinton is Governor of New York and General McDougal a
delegate in Congress, and yet both those officers retain their rank in the army. As
to the officers of the Virginia line several of them have expressed their wish that I
would undertake to act in this post, and I hope it would be for their advantage to
have the department put into the hands of a continental officer. From the urgency
of the Governor's application to me to accept the office, and his pressing request
that I will immediately undertake the business of it, I propose to repair to
Richmond tomorrow....89
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This letter clearly showed he wanted to act as Commissioner of War, but that
many impediments stood in his way. Despite his eagerness and that of the Virginia
Executive, Colonel Davies was too shrewd to cast away the advantages of his present
situation for the uncertain prospects of the Virginia War Office. His rank and
emoluments represented all the wealth that he could hope to obtain after the war was over
and it would be folly to lose them. That is the reason he only accepted the post
conditionally. The letter also made it clear that Colonel Davies did not foresee any
opposition to his serving in the post from his superior officers. On this part, Colonel
Davies was right on the mark. Both Steuben and Greene enthusiastically endorsed his
application. Steuben notified Greene ofDavies's appointment on March 30, 1781
expressing that Colonel Davies was the "properest person" for the post and would render
great service in it. 90 General Greene was pleased about Colonel Davies's appointment
and wrote to Colonel Davies on April 11, 1781:
Nothing would induce me to consent to your taking the direction of the war
department; but a persuasion that you can render more important services to the
public in general and not less to the army in particular by holding that office than
without it. However you must continue at times to assist all in your power to
compleat the arrangement of the army. I believe no state abounding with such a
plenty as Virginia, ever experienced such a scarcity for want oforder and proper
application of her supplies. From your abilities and application I am in hopes
there will be a great reformation, but before you engage in this business give me
leave to tell you it will be difficult under the best arrangement to keep pace with
the demands ofthe service, and therefore don't get discouraged because you
cannot at once effect what you wish and what is absolutely requisite. 91
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The wise general praised Colonel Davies's abilities, but also warned of the
difficulties involved in the task. With the endorsement of Steuben and Greene, Colonel
Davies needed to pass one other hurdle before he could accept the post of Commissioner
of the War Office. Unfortunately for Colonel Davies, it proved to be impassible on the
terms he wished. True to his promise, Governor Jefferson had solicited Congress in favor
of Colonel Davies's appointment to the War Office while retaining his rank and
emoluments. Jefferson wrote to the Virginia Delegates asking for their support, citing the
numerous examples of Continental officers holding civil positions while still actively
holding rank. His examples included officers such as Governor George Clinton of New
York and General Alexander McDougall, a delegate in Congress. 92 Jefferson also wrote
a letter to Samuel Huntington, the President of Congress, stating that the post of
Commissioner of the Virginia War Office was essential to Virginia and the Continent and
that they could find no one else worthy and willing to do the job. 93 Despite Jefferson's
appeals and the logic of his argument, Congress decided that Colonel Davies could not
hold the position while retaining his rank and emoluments. It considered the
Commissioner of the War Office to be a civil post and therefore an active military officer
would be ineligible to hold it.94 The best the Virginia Delegates in Congress could
manage was a compromise that would allow Colonel Davies to retire without losing any
emoluments to which he was entitled. 95 This was not acceptable to Colonel Davies as he
wished to retain his active duty status and rank.
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Indeed, Colonel Davies was rather shocked that Congress had barred his way by
considering the Commissioner of the War Office as a civil post. General Greene had
given his approval and clearly considered the post as part of the state military
establishment. In response to General Steuben's inquiry, Greene had written that the
regulations of Congress only barred an officer from holding "two offices under
Congress" and not a state and continental office simultaneously. 96 Greene would not
have made such a ruling if he did not consider the Commissioner of the War Office as a
state military office. At any rate, the resolution of Congress stood. If Colonel Davies
wished to accept the appointment to the War Office, he would have to give up his rank
and active status in the Continental Army. Colonel Davies had maintained all along that
he would not accept the appointment on such conditions. By the time Governor Jefferson
received word of Congress's determination on the matter, Colonel Davies had been
acting as the interim Commissioner for almost a month. Steuben had given Colonel
Davies permission to act on March 26, 1781. 97 Greene, Steuben and Jefferson all agreed
that Colonel Davies was the right man for the job, but could not prevail on Davies to
relinquish his rank in the army. A compromise was needed and it fell to General Greene,
as Commander in chief of the Southern army, to arrange one. Since Virginia had so few
men in the field and Colonel Christian Febiger, whose commission had seniority over
Davies's, was available to take over Davies's duties in recruiting, Colonel Davies could
remain as acting Commissioner of the Virginia War Office until Virginia had raised
enough recruits to require his attendance in the field. This meant that Colonel Davies
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was able to act as Commissioner of the War Office, but that he would not be officially
appointed to that post. In fact, Colonel Davies never took an oath of office even though
required by law and never made use of any official signature annexed to his name.98 As
part of the compromise, Colonel Davies was left off the Continental payrolls and
subsisted on the salary of the Commissioner of the War Office. He still drew Continental
forage and rations as he continued to perform some Continental duties from time to time,
as assigned by General Greene. 99
While Colonel Davies and Jefferson were waiting on the resolution of Congress,
Colonel Davies waded into the confused business of the Virginia War Office. He
officially began entering letters in the War Office Letter Book on March 26, 1781, four
days after Colonel Muter had resigned. 100 As one of his first acts as interim
Commissioner of War, Colonel Davies began to streamline the business of the War
Office. He applied to Jefferson to allow one of the officers of the new State Regiment to
do the duty of Town Major in Richmond and to superintend the public works. He
complained to Jefferson that "It is impossible for the duties of this office to be done
without confusion, if the Commissioner's attention is perpetually distracted with orders
for provision for this man, and rum for another, and a pair of shoes for a third." 101 The
duties of the War Office were vague and confusion reigned supreme when Colonel
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Davies assumed the duties of the post. In addition to the confusion in the War Office,
Davies was still under Steuben's orders to superintend the recruiting at Chesterfield Court
House. Colonel Davies tried to explain to Steuben the impossibility of doing both jobs,
but failed. In the end Davies was prevailed upon to do both duties by attending
Chesterfield on "Saturdays after noon and Sundays." In order to relieve himself of
around the clock work at both positions, he requested an additional clerk for the War
Office, which Jefferson granted on a temporary basis. 102 Colonel Davies was now
overcome with work but diligently attended to his duties.
As Davies began the business of reorganizing the Virginia War Office, an
interesting development occurred. The General Assembly had requested that Governor
Jefferson submit a new plan of operation for the War Office before the next session.
Governor Jefferson, already planning to resign when the next session met, referred the
matter to his new interim Commissioner. Colonel Davies was placed in the enviable
position of writing his own job description. In a letter to General Greene, Colonel Davies
stated that the War Office "stands upon a very insufficient footing" and that the state's
quartermaster department was in a "deplorable and indeed ridiculous situation." 103
Colonel Davies planned to rectify the weaknesses of the Virginia War Office in hopes of
establishing regularity and efficiency. He immediately set about developing a plan for
the operation of the War Office. He had until the May 1781 session of the General
Assembly to assemble the plan, but due to the invasion of Virginia by Generals Phillips
and Cornwallis the General Assembly had to meet in June at Staunton. Colonel Davies
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submitted his plan to the Executive Council on June 18, 1781. He considered his present
employment as Commissioner of the War Office, and his six years of service in various
military branches as qualifications enough to offer his opinion to the Council. He also
asked that it pass along his plan to the legislature with any observations they might have.
Colonel Davies plan pointed out that:
... frequent examination, is the way to make men diligent as well as honest;
without it, fraud and negligence would soon exhaust the riches of a country much
more wealthy than ours-From this cause chiefly, originate the complaints which
so generally prevail, of mismanagement in the several military departments. With
an infinate variety of business on the hands of the Executive, it will always be
impossible for them to attend to scrutinies of this kind; and of course they will
never be able to obtain a just knowledge of the real state or application of the
stores and resources of the country. This then is one of the great duties of the War
Office, to prepare for the inspection of government, such documents as will
enable them to form proper ideas of the state of the public supplies, and of the
conduct of their servants in the discharge of the duties of their several
appointments. 104
Colonel Davies was not proposing a new idea, but merely reinforcing an old one.
The War Office was always intended to collect and report all military information to the
Executive. Colonel Davies was maintaining that, although this was obvious, it had not
always been practiced. In order to correct this problem, he suggested that the
Commissioner of the War Office be vested by law "with an inquisitorial power, and have
authority to demand from the different military departments exact returns of their receipts
and issues, and of all other matters incident to their offices, according to the nature of
their respective employments." 105 Colonel Davies was insisting that the Commissioner
have real authority delegated by law instead of implied through the authority of the
Governor. Under the Act of 1780, the Commissioner of the War Office had no powers
4
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spelled out for him in the law, save what the Executive decided to give him. This
resulted in a powerless Commissioner who could request information but had no punitive
measures to enact if the request was ignored. Under Davies's plan, the military
departments were required by law to deliver periodic returns to the Commissioner.
Colonel Davies's plan also detailed what returns should be sent to the War Office from
the Quartermaster, Commissary, and Clothing departments. He listed the several
complaints about the mismanagement in those departments that could be avoided by
investing the Commissioner of War with an inquisitorial power. He also mentioned that
the Commissary of Military stores should make periodic returns to the War Office as well
as oversee the laboratories and magazines in the state. His plan went beyond just the
military departments to include the Auditor's Office. He maintained that returns of
articles impressed by the various military departments and settled at the Auditor's Office
should be made to the War Office in order that they may count against the Continental
quota required from the state. He further stated that this would allow the Executive to
detect the great abuses which occur during impressments and put a stop to them. 106
Evidently, the War Office had not been keeping such records before Davies suggested it,
which meant that Virginia was paying out more than its quota required.
Another major suggestion in Colonel Davies's plan for the War Office was that
the Commissioner of the War Office should be allotted the duties of the Adjutant
General's department. All of the Executive's orders should issue through the War Office
to prevent confusion and descriptive lists and rosters should be lodged there as well. This
was a powerful suggestion, because previously the War Office would sometimes order
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one thing and find that the Executive had ordered another. Colonel Davies was trying to
avoid the confusion caused by a splintered chain of command. It would also mean that
an order from the Commissioner of War would carry the same weight as if it were from
the Governor. Colonel Davies's plan quickly vested the Commissioner of the War Office
with real power and moved him away from simply being another clerk for the Executive.
Davies, however, was aware that even the Commissioner needed some check against his
powers. Davies's plan stated:
He [the Commissioner] should at all times be responsible to the Executive for his
conduct, and controllable by them; yet it will be wrong to subject him to the delay
of taking their opinion in every step he may think necessary for the public good,
and of having their previous approbation as a prerequisite, before he can do
anything, as is the case at present. It is sufficient that the Executive can interfere
when they please, and give him such orders as they think proper. A prudent
Commissioner however, will, for his own security crave their advice and
directions on every matter of importance in his department: the officer should be
displaced that would not. 107
Colonel Davies recognized the need for the Commissioner of the War Office to
have real power in order to execute his duties. His plan allowed the office some
autonomy while still subjecting it to the power of the Governor and Executive Council.
He also recommended that a few clerks be allowed in case the Commissioner had to be
out of the office on business. 108
Colonel Davies submitted this plan to the Executive Council on June 18, 1781,
the same day that the House of Delegates brought in a bill to regulate the department of
the War Office. It is assumed that the Executive Council transmitted Colonel Davies's
plan to the legislature because the House of Delegates debated the bill on June 20, 1781
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and made several amendments to their original bilI. 109 The next day the bill was passed
in the House and sent to the Senate which returned the bill with several amendments.
The House agreed with the Senate's amendments and passed "An Act to regulate the
Department of the War Office."110
Colonel Davies must have been elated to find that the new War Office Act was
almost a direct copy of the plan he submitted to the Executive. The legislature had
obviously used it in determining the new War Office's functions. The act vested the
Commissioner with an inquisitorial power and even spelled out for each department the
kind of returns that were required and set up a periodical schedule for their filing. The
Act also gave the Commissioner the powers of the Adjutant General's department and
even spelled them out as in Davies's plan. The most important part of the new act,
however, was the clause which gave the Commissioner of War the autonomy he needed
to function efficiently. The Commissioner received the authority to "Superintend the
establishment of magazines, regularity of issues, and shall in general direct and manage
all matters and things within the department of war, as well as all persons holding offices
or performing duties within that department."111 This clause provided the Commissioner
of War sweeping powers to do his duty, but the most important part was what was left
out. There was no restraining clause that required that the Commissioner act only under
direct orders from the Governor. Colonel Davies had received the autonomy he knew
would be needed to operate the War Office efficiently.
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Colonel Davies continued to serve as Commissioner of the Virginia War Office
until December 1782. After the Siege of Yorktown, the prospects of peace with Great
Britain had been increasing in the minds of the General Assembly and it began to
dismantle the military establishment in Virginia. With peace thought to be on the
horizon, the General Assembly quickly moved to relieve Virginia of its wartime tax
burden and expenses. One of the first cuts in Virginia's military establishment was the
Virginia War Office. A bill was introduced in the House to repeal all of the acts relating
to the War Office on November 20, 1782. 112 Colonel Davies was hardly pleased as he
felt that the War Office was finally getting all the military departments into order. In a
letter to Richard Henry Lee, he insisted that the bill was directed against the War Office
on other grounds rather than financial concerns. He wrote that the state needed the War
Office "but a few gentlemen have conceived a jealousy that there is danger to the
constitution in entrusting any authority to the Commissioner of War, because I happen to
be an officer in the army."113 Colonel Davies clearly thought that the War Office was a
necessity to his state and could not comprehend why these gentlemen feared a position,
which was subject to the immediate control of the Executive.
Despite Colonel Davies's opinion, the General Assembly passed an act, which
repealed all the legislation relating to the War Office on December 24, 1782. 114 The act
abolished the Virginia War Office and returned all of its duties to the Executive or
whomever they chose to appoint. The act also instructed Colonel Davies to tum over all
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of the War Office's accounts, books and vouchers as well as any other public property to
the Governor and Executive Council.115 Colonel Davies was aware of the developments
in the General Assembly and had already been preparing himself to give up the post of
Commissioner ofWar. On December 9, 1782, Colonel Davies wrote Governor Harrison
that he was ready to settle his accounts and deliver up the War Office whenever so
commanded. His only request was that he be allowed to settle with warrants, as he had
not been paid a farthing since August of 1779.116 The Executive replied on December 11,
1782 instructing Colonel Davies to deliver his papers to the Clerk of the Council. 117 It is
interesting to note that six days later the Executive Council was forced to appoint Thomas
Meriwether as an additional clerk. The Council blamed its need for an additional clerk
on its increased business due to the abolition of the War Office. 118 Colonel Davies had
been right that the state still needed the Virginia War Office.
After leaving the War Office, Colonel Davies began to rebuild his life as a lawyer.
He had wished to remain in the army but "being the youngest Colonel in the Virginia
Line" he found that as Congress cut back its military establishment, he was to be
retired. 119 In the arrangement held at Winchester Barracks in January 1783, Colonel
Davies was officially mustered out of service as the Colonel of the First Virginia
Regiment. The arrangement as a whole simply wiped away the paper establishment that
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had been created at the Chesterfield Arrangement in 1781.120 He was now faced with the
task ofrebuilding his law practice. Unfortunately for Davies, he had lost most ofhis law
books and property in Norfolk and Suffolk during the war. With nothing tying him down
in Chesapeake, Davies moved to Petersburg and set up a new law practice after the war.
He may have moved to Petersburg in order to court Mary Murry Gordon, the widow of
Alexander Gordon ofPetersburg, whom he eventually married. 121 As he resumed his law
practice, he kept his eye on the political situation in Virginia. When it became known
that agents for the state were to be elected to settle Virginia's accounts with the United
States, William Davies offered himselfas a candidate. In 1788 he was elected and
traveled to Philadelphia and New York attending the business ofthe settlement. He was
perhaps the most qualified man for this endeavor as the former head ofthe War Office.
He was intimately familiar with both the state and Continental supply systems and had
served during General William Phillips's invasion ofVirginia and the campaign at
Yorktown. This gave him personal knowledge ofmany ofthe claims against the
Continent. Through his efforts, Virginia was able to get a satisfactory settlement with the
United States, which did justice to the claims ofVirginia. 122 After returning from his
employment as State Agent, William Davies moved back to Norfolk and was appointed
Collector ofthe Port by President John Adams in 1800. He lived there until his death on
December 23, 1805. 123
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CHAPTER 3:
THE CHALLENGES OF THE WAR OFFICE
The War Office Records provide an interesting glimpse into the hardships of
planning, supplying, and waging war. These records clearly demonstrate the issues that
affected the strategies and preparations for war in the Commonwealth of Virginia. The
duties of the War Office were broadly defined and encompassed almost every aspect of
the war effort. The Commissioner of War's duties ranged from adjutant general to
superintendent of the Commonwealth's military factories and beyond. Naturally, a
public official charged with so many responsibilities would face multiple trials in
carrying out his job. He confronted many obstacles that were beyond his control, but that
had to be overcome for the good of the war effort.
The first major problem facing the War Office was the lack of information on the
state's ability to wage war, which affected every aspect of the war effort and the state's
ability to plan accordingly. The Commissioner of War viewed the gathering and
reporting of information to government as "one of the great duties of the War Office." 1
In fact, it was the primary responsibility of the War Office to gather information so that it
could accurately report to the government on the condition of the state's war machine.
Unfortunately for the Commissioner of War, many impediments stood in his way of
procuring accurate information.
From the beginning, one of the most frustrating obstacles in collecting
information was the willful neglect or outright refusal of the state's own military staff
departments and County Lieutenants to report information to the War Office. One of the
first surviving records of the War Office is a letter from Governor Jefferson to
1
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Commissioner of War Muter, in which Jefferson complains about the State Commissary
not obeying two previous orders to file a return and asks the Commissioner to issue a
third order. 2 It is interesting to note that the Commissioner of War's powers at this point
were defined by the Governor, and therefore when the Commissioner of War was writing
to request information it was assumed the order really come from the Governor. This
example clearly illustrates that the origin of the order did not concern the Commissary at
all.
Other departments were also at fault. Colonel Muter complained about "No
account from the Quarter Master General's department for articles and services furnished
the continent have ever come in to be examined."3 The staff departments were also
negligent in dealing with the second Commissioner of War, Colonel William Davies.
This took place despite the fact that the Assembly had tried to help the War Office by
making it a law, not just an order from the Executive, for the staff departments to file
returns with the War Office. Colonel Davies ordered the Commissary General of
Provision, John Browne, to provide an immediate return of his department. To induce
him to comply, Davies added:
I enclose you an extract from an act for regulating the war department; for your
more particular information, and to show you how far you and I are connected.
The business prescribed in it is essentially necessary to be immediately attended
to, and I must insist upon a speedy compliance with the law, and request a state of
your department to the first of July.4
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Unfortunately, even the Assembly's measures to aid the War Office proved
ineffectual in getting the reports filed in the War Office. The state military staff
departments were not the only culprits in failing to make proper and timely returns. The
County Lieutenants, who administered the affairs of government at the local level, were
also delinquent. Many other local officials like the Commissioners of the Provision Law
and the Commissioners of the Specifics Tax were also offenders. The local county
officials were responsible for their county's supplies and militia and were therefore
supposed to report their condition to the War Office. Colonel Davies constantly
complained to the County Lieutenants and the various Commissioners about their
inattention to filing their returns. He was quite fond of reminding his correspondents that
their returns were required by the law.

5

Receiving returns was not the only problem the War Office faced in gathering
information. When the Commissioner of War received a return it was frequently
incomplete, or worse, exaggerated in its scope. Colonel Muter complained to an
unknown correspondent, but probably a member of the Assembly, that though many
County Lieutenants had made returns, "this however has by no means produced full
returns."6 Colonel Davies added that "the regularity of returns is so generally neglected
by County Lieutenants" that "government have it not in their power to make any
equitable distribution" of muskets to the militias of the various counties.7 With his keen
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attention to detail, Colonel Davies often mentioned the faults of particular returns. In a
letter to Major Richard Call, he observed that the dragoon who delivered the Major's
return was wearing a shabby uniform, but the return itself did not mention a single coat or
waistcoat. Colonel Davies remarked that he hoped the dragoons were not naked as
represented in the return. 8 A more serious problem than an incomplete return was an
exaggerated one. The Commissioner of War also addressed this issue with Major Call:
I will conclude with one friendly remark, that it is bad policy in a corps to
exaggerate its wants. Government will be more disposed to supply a corps that is
half equipped than one that has hardly anything, both because they despair of ever
equipping them, and because it will unavoidably occasion some small diffidence
of the care of the Officers. I am persuaded, considering the frequent applications
of Lee's and Nelson's Corps, you will not think this hint amiss.9
Obviously, incomplete and exaggerated returns affected the ability of the War
Office to assess need properly and supply the various departments under the War Office.
This, however, was not the only problem with the information contained in the returns.
Upon occasion, the information in a return was presented in such a confusing manner that
the Commissioner of War could not decipher what the return was trying to report. 10 In
addition to these problems with information gathering, the War Office had to deal with
many other issues that affected their ability to report accurate information to government.
Letters could take quite a long time to reach their intended destination and it was quite
easy for them to miscarry altogether.
Another issue was the invasion of the state by the British. Each time the British
arrived, it caused supplies and men to be dispersed in an emergency fashion which was
8
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often unorganized. The most glaring example was the sacking of Richmond and
Westham by Benedict Arnold in early January of 1781. Unfortunately for Colonel
Muter, the acting Commissioner of War, the records of the state were mistakenly
deposited in a magazine at Westham during Arnold's invasion and were destroyed. This
was a real blow to the state and especially to the War Office, since it lost all the
information it had gathered prior to the invasion. 11 The ultimate consequence of the loss
was the dismissal of Muter and the appointment of Colonel Davies as the Commissioner
of War. In addition to invasion by the enemy, the War Office had to contend with
improper forwarding of supplies and unauthorized seizures which inevitably nullified the
accuracy of the original return. 12
The Commissioner of War, well aware of all of these obstacles, tried to use every
means available to combat them. The War Office attempted various ways to obtain the
information the government needed so badly. The most often used tactic was simply to
write and complain to the offending party while reminding them of the law. When that
approach failed, multiple letters were sent to remind the offender to file the returns. 13 In
dealing with Continental Officers, who were not subject to control of the War Office but
still had valuable information relating to the supply of the Virginia Continental Line, the
Commissioner of War often had trouble getting the proper returns to make his plans.
Colonel Davies's best tactic in this case was to apply directly to the Commander in Chief
of the Southern Army, General Greene. On at least one occasion, when Davies was
11
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frustrated in his attempts, he complained to General Greene about his inability to obtain
returns of the Virginia Cavalry & Artillery from their officers. He asked Greene to order
the officers to send the returns to the War Office. 14 In this manner, the Commissioner of
War went over the heads of the noncompliant officers to achieve his goal.
Another favorite tactic of Colonel Davies was to remind the County Lieutenants
and staff departments that they were required by law to furnish the War Office with
returns. When that failed to produce the desired effect, the Commissioner of War had
other means at his disposal. In the case of John Browne, the Commissary General of
Provision who refused to file returns, Colonel Davies asked for an enquiry into his
conduct by the Executive Council. In a letter on July 19, 1781, the Commissioner of War
admonished the Commissary for not providing information to the War Office "which was
in a position to aid his department" with the consequence of a government enquiry into
his conduct. 15 Luckily for Davies, the Commissary decided to resign rather than submit
to the enquiry, and in doing so saved the Commissioner of War the trouble of conducting
the investigation. Davies, in a letter to Governor Nelson, congratulated the country
because it could now receive a better arrangement that would cause fewer problems for
the War Office and better provisions for the troops. 16 The enquiry was but one tool the
Commissioner of War could use to overcome the negligence of some officers to file
returns. On another occasion the Commissioner of War asked for a special resolution of
14
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the Executive Council requiring the manager of the arms factory in Fredericksburg to file
monthly returns. The manager of the factory, Charles Dick, was supposed to be under the
Commissioner's supervision, but had trouble making timely returns to the War Office. 17
In this way, the War Office hoped to reinforce the idea of timely returns without
removing an important component in the public armory.
The problems of inaccurate and exaggerated returns were handled in a different
manner. Originally, the Commissioner of War provided specific instructions as to what
he wanted in the return. The Commissioners of the Provision Law, for example, were to
record the name and rank of individuals who drew supplies from them. They were also
instructed to make returns to the Quarter Master of their forage and a return of provision
to the Commissary General of Provision. 18 Colonel Davies, however, decided that the
best way to ensure consistent information was to enclose forms in his circular letters and
to instruct the County Lieutenants and staff departments to use the new forms. 19 It was
hoped that if a standard form were used the returns would be complete and accurate. The
officer filling out the form simply completed each column with the desired information.
The issues that faced the War Office when gathering information for the
government still remained, but the Commissioner of War did everything in his power to
overcome them. The efficacy of the War Office can be judged by a report submitted to
the General Assembly by the War Office on December 1781. In it, the War Office was
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able to provide substantial information, but by the admission of Colonel Davies it was not
as much as he hoped. He apologized to the Speaker of the House that the returns
are so imperfect I sincerely lament, but my repeated solicitations to the different
officers and agents for the necessary papers have not proved effectual to procure
them. I hope therefore the indulgence of the house will pardon the defective state
in which the enclosed reports unavoidably appear. 20
The Commissioner of War made seven reports to the House and attempted to
explain the problems with each return. In the first report on militia strength, Davies
complained that the County Lieutenants sent inaccurate and incomplete forms. He
summarized:
In short so various were the modes adopted, that no certainty of information could
be obtained from them, and government were almost as much instructed after
receiving the returns as they were before. To alleviate this inconvenience a model
was transmitted to each county for their observance but which I am sorry to say
has been very little attended to. 21
Despite the inadequacies of the militia returns, Davies did believe that some
useful information was present. For instance, in the report on the total strength of the
state's militia he estimated that at least one-tenth of the state's militia were fit only for
invalid duty. He was also able to point out that the number of militia officers were
disproportionate to the number of militia effectives in many counties. In some counties
that meant they had too many officers, and in others too few. 22 In the second report about
arms, ammunition, and accoutrements, Davies determined that the chief problem with the
military stores was the militia's absconding with the public arms at an alarming rate. If
20
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the militia did not keep the public arms, then they damaged them during use, creating yet
another problem. Davies explained "as matters are now arranged, all the state armories in
our intervals ofpeace have been found unequal for the reparations ofthe injuries ofthe
arms have received during the several invasions." The Commissioner ofWar
recommended allowing the public, under certain regulations, to purchase the arms. He
reasoned that ifthe militia owned the arms themselves they were more likely to take care
ofthem. 23
In the third report, Davies presented what returns he had ofthe state's recruits for
the Continental Line. Once again, he lamented that the counties had paid little heed to
keeping good records and transmitting them to the War Office. In fact, most ofthe
information he did have seems to have been transmitted from the Continental officers.
Because the counties had not used the descriptive forms he sent, he feared that many
recruits, who had enlisted for the war in the counties, simply told the Continental officers
at the general rendezvous that they had enlisted for eighteen months. Consequently,
Virginia was denied proper credit for the bounties it had issued to the recruits. The
Continental books would only give Virginia credit for the smaller bounty paid to eighteen
months men instead ofthe larger bounty already advanced for an enlistment for the war. 24
In the fourth report, the Commissioner ofWar provided all ofthe information he
had on the various militia delinquents from each county. Unfortunately, the inattention to
the enforcement ofthe militia law, which required delinquents to be sentenced to six
months ofservice, allowed many to escape unpunished. Davies even stated that
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numerous delinquents appeared to have enlisted in the volunteer legions to try to avoid
their regular duty. The volunteer legions up to that point had not been called into
•

service. 25
In the fifth report, Colonel Davies reviewed the current state of the clothing law
which required the counties to provide a certain amount of clothing for the Virginia
troops. Many of the counties had not started to collect clothing and those counties that
had could not give an accurate accounting. In many cases, Davies believed the clothing
to be of poor quality and not necessarily the required type. The most worrisome trend
noted in this return was many county commissioners' issuance of clothing without
authorization from the state government. This, of course, would dramatically affect any
plans the War Office had made to clothe the Virginia troops. Davies ended this report by
reminding the House that "as the law now stands there is no prohibition to restrain the
county lieutenants from issuing the clothing they receive nor is there a mode prescribed
for the transportation or collection of it."26
In the sixth report, Colonel Davies provided all the information he had on the
quantity of supplies the Commissioners of the Specifics Tax had collected and applied.
Once again, he lamented that many of the commissioners went beyond their duties and
issued the provisions without orders from government. The Commissioner of War
predicted that unless laws were enacted, the specifics would continue to be misapplied,
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and worse, the state would receive no credit from the Continent because the specifics
were issued outside of proper channels.27
In the last report to the Assembly, the War Office accounted for the wagons the
state had collected for the use of the Continent. Davies reported some were turned away
as insufficient, and those that were taken often were not given vouchers to make it a
Continental charge. Another problem, the Commissioner of War mentioned, was that the
law for providing wagons did not require their value to be ascertained. Consequently, the
Commonwealth relied on the books of the Continental Quartermasters for their value.
Davies pointed out that the wagons could be undervalued and Virginia would have no
way of arguing the point. At the end of this last report, Colonel Davies concluded:
It would have afforded some great satisfaction to have been able to have laid
before the house the various other returns which by law are required from me.
But the confusion and derangements which were occasioned by the rapid
incursions of the enemy followed by the great and [repeated] exertions required
from every public department for the facilitating and support of the late operations
below rendered it impractical to obtain the necessary information from the
different officers. 28
While the War Office freely admitted that its information was incomplete, it was
still effective in providing information to the government. Its inability to procure the
correct information rests on the shoulders of others. The War Office Records show the
diligence of Colonel Davies in asking for returns. The underlying problem is the
autonomy of the County Lieutenants who seem not to recognize any responsibility to
state government. In fact, the state government had no way to coerce local officials to do
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their duty.29 The War Office relied on their good will to answer its calls for returns. In
spite of this weakness, the War Office did provide logistical support to the government.
While information gathering was a major problem for the War Office, it was not
the only difficulty the Commissioner of War faced. The many different missions of his
office meant that he dealt with other issues as well; the most important of which was the
finances of the Commonwealth of Virginia. Money is a critical ingredient to waging a
successful war, and the State Treasury was depleted. The economy was already burdened
with debt from the French and Indian War. This meant that the current war would have
to be funded largely on credit.30 The initial plan of the Assembly was to fund the war
with paper money backed by the collection of future taxes. This failed because few taxes
were collected and therefore the public credit rapidly declined. By 1779, the
Commonwealth was forced to use commodity taxes to try to bolster the public credit. 31
This, however, also proved ineffective in establishing the public credit on sound footing.
When the War Office was created in 1780 the state's finances were in disrepair and paper
money was depreciating rapidly. The value of the state's paper money depreciated from
40 to 1 in 1780, to 150 to 1 in April of 1781 and finally to 800-1000 to 1 by September
1781.32 This financial climate placed the War Office in the unenviable position of
waging war with an empty war chest. The scarcity of funds affected the War Office in
many ways.
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One of the War Office's financial duties was to pay the salaries of the state troops
and staff departments involved in supplying the army. The Journal of the War Office is
filled with warrants issued by the Commissioner of War to the paymasters of the various
corps of state and continental troops. For instance, on January 30, 1781, Colonel Muter
issued a warrant in favor of Robert Boush, the paymaster for the State Garrison
Regiment, for 78,244 pounds 6 pence. This amount compensated the regiment for the
months of August through December and settled their account in new money at 40 to 1
depreciation. 33 The War Office was able to pay the troops in many cases, but that was
not always true. After the invasions by the enemy had passed, supernumerary officers
often applied for pay. The Commissioner of War, conscious of the state of the Treasury,
issued instructions to the paymaster on how their pay should be administered. Since the
Treasury could not afford to pay all of the supernumerary officers, Captain Windsor
Browne was ordered to issue warrants to officers only if they had proper vouchers and
proof of actual service in the invasion.34 Supernumerary officers were not the only ones
to feel the effects of the budget crunch. The War Office reported to the executive that
repeated applications for money were coming in from the officers of the Virginia
Continental Line. Colonel Davies believed the reasons for so many requests to be the
depreciation of money and the delay of their past payments. In fact, Davies reminded the
Governor that the officers had not been paid in over a year and a half, except on
account.35 This exemplifies the problem the War Office faced. Because the Treasury
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lacked the funds, the War Office was forced to delay payments. When the situation of
the officers became too grim, the Commissioner of War would allow officers to draw
supplies on account in lieu of their pay. The regular troops, however, did not have this
luxury and the irregularity of their pay clearly undermined morale and led to desertion.
The financial situation not only affected the troops in service, but it also greatly
impacted the state's ability to recruit new troops. The recruiting laws offered generous
bounties for recruits that signed up for the service. The longer the recruit was willing to
commit to service, the higher his bounty. The War Office was in charge of issuing the
recruiting money to the various officers of the Virginia Continental Line. Two critical
problems faced the War Office when dealing with recruiting. The first depended solely
on the Treasury and the second on the recruiting officers themselves. In the first case, the
issue was the amount of money government could afford to allocate to recruiting. This
was out of the control of the War Office, but there appears to have been a small but
steady flow of money from the Treasury. This was especially true during the Yorktown
Campaign. The War Office issued 18 warrants for $3,100,000 in paper money between
September and November 1781. 36 Obviously, the prospect for victory over Cornwallis
was a recruiter's dream and it seems like an outrageous sum of money until depreciation
is calculated. At a rate of 1000 to 1, the princely sum of $3,100,000 is reduced to a mere
$3,100.
Once the War Office had the warrant for the recruiting money, the second
problem became evident. Paper money was depreciating so quickly that the longer the
War Office had the warrant, the less it was worth. Colonel Davies wasted no time in
36
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calling the various recruiting officers to get their money. In a letter to Major Thomas
Posey on September 4, 1781, Davies repeated his request for an officer to come get the
warrant "because money is daily depreciating."37 On September 11, 1781, the
Commissioner of War again wrote to Posey complaining that "if not put to use [the
money] will depreciate into a worthless condition"38 Finally, Major Posey sent a
Captain, who drew the warrant from the paymaster on September 20, 1781, to recruit for
the regiment. 39
Most of the issues relating to recruiting were beyond the control of the War
Office. The Commissioner of War could only issue what funds he received from the
Treasury, which necessitated an urgent request for the proper officer to come take it.
Aside from that, the War Office's only control over the finances of the recruiters was to
admonish them to spend it frugally.40 The biggest concern for the recruits was the bounty
itself. If it was in paper money, they refused to enlist, and if they had enlisted, they
refused to march. Depreciation caused morale to plummet and led to desertions and
mutiny.41 In 1782, recruiting became more difficult when the Assembly abolished paper
money, but neglected to update the recruiting law. The recruiting law stipulated that the
bounties were to be paid in paper money. The end result was few enlistments and some
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1781,WOR,LV,microfilm reel 632,29.
38
39

150.

William Davies to Major Posey, September 11,1781,Ibid.,57.
Warrant on Foster Webb Paymaster, September 20,1781,JWO, WOR,LV,microfilm reel 633,

40

William Davies to Colonel Febiger, August 27, 1781, WOLB January 18, 1781-September 1,
1781, WOR,LV, microfilm reel 632,211.
41

William Davies to Governor Harrison,December 17, 1781, WOLB November 2, 1781-January
22, 1782, WOR, LV, microfilm reel 632, 140-141.

77

very puzzled recruiting officers.42 The War Office was powerless to help and the
Treasury was bankrupt.
Besides recruiting and paying the troops, the War Office was also responsible for
the pay of the state staff departments. This included the Commissary of Hides and his
tannery, the State Clothier and his factory at the Albemarle Barracks, the Quartermaster's
Department and the Commissary of Military Stores, as well as the Commissary General
of Purchases. Many examples of issued warrants exist in the Journal of the War Office.
For instance, a warrant issued on July 20, 1781 for 9,698 pounds 10 shillings to pay the
Commissary of Military Stores and his assistants.43 As expected, when the Treasury was
low, these departments suffered a similar fate as the troops and officers of the line.
The War Office was also responsible for the pay of the workmen in the factories
and labs which made the supplies for the army. When the Treasury had the money, many
warrants were issued to pay the men working in the factories and especially the foundry
at Westham.44 Unfortunately, when the money in the Treasury ran low, the state's
artificers and workmen suffered as much as the troops in the field. It was far more urgent
to pay them, however, as many were not enlisted and therefore could abandon the public
work. If the workmen in the public works stopped doing their jobs, the consequences
could prove fatal to the troops in the field. By December 1781, the situation of the
clothing factory at Albemarle Barracks was horrible. The workmen were unpaid and
destitute for clothing themselves. The state was completely dependent on this factory to
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clothe all of its troops. The Commissioner of War represented to the Governor that
45

despite the emptiness of the Treasury, something had to be done or it would "ruin us."

The clothing factory at the Barracks was not the only public works to suffer from want of
pay. Colonel Davies had to "acknowledge [the] embarrassing situation of the [gun]
factory due to want of pay, depreciation of money, and the confusion due to the approach
of the enemy." All Davies could do to help Charles Dick, the manager of the
Fredericksburg gun factory, was to issue a certificate and offer the following advice.
"Tell the men to wait awhile and not worry because [their] pay will match [the]
depreciation."46 Without money, the War Office was powerless to pay the workmen, but
there were other alternatives.
The War Office did try to work around the finance problem by prevailing on the
workmen to take late payments and in some cases finding an alternative to pay. In the
case of the clothing factory, Davies asked for an order from the Governor to allow the
Commissary of Stores to supply the workmen with articles of clothing to be deducted
from their earned pay.47 If the War Office could not pay the workmen their salaries, it
would at least try to pay them in kind. The Commissioner of War also recommended to
the County Lieutenants that they should sell spoilable commodities collected as taxes to
raise money to pay their wagon teams. He argued that punctual payments were
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impossible due to the state of the Treasury, and that if government began missing
payments the public would lose even more faith in its credit.48
Colonel Davies expanded his efforts to get money to his factories by allowing
various managers to take on private work to raise money for their departments. He gave
orders to Captain James Anderson to "employ the public artificers in private works for
money when there is no public business to be done."49 With money growing more and
more scarce, the Commissioner of War was forced to adopt another measure to get work
done. Since he could not pay salaries with regularity, Colonel Davies turned to militia
exemptions as his last option. It did not cost the state and that gave a potential artificer or
workman an incentive to enlist. Davies was adamant men sign up for at least six months
as an artificer in order to procure a militia exemption. In order for the exemption to be
official, it had to be countersigned by the County Lieutenant and registered in the War
Office. 5° Colonel Davies wanted to preserve the authority of the County Lieutenant over
his militia, but the need for labor at a cheap rate was of a higher priority. In circular
letters to the County Lieutenants, the Commissioner of War explained that the
Commissioners of the Specifics Tax "need aid and since [we] can't pay wages we must
.
from service.
. ,,51
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The War Office tried its best to keep the military factories of the state running, but
the finances of the state became increasingly worse. In 1782, the General Assembly
abolished paper money and embarked on a cost cutting scheme that devastated the ability
of the War Office to meet its contracts. The War Office was ordered to trim the staff
departments, reduce the number of state troops and not to advance any more supplies to
the Continent except for the funds required by the Continental Congress. Colonel Davies
was horrified for his prospects of supply when he realized that the "abolition of paper
money' and the "slow business of taxes" would mean the Treasury would be "penniless
until next fall."52 In a letter to the Commercial Agent, who purchased the materials for
the factories, the Commissioner of War warned that it was better to buy clothing instead
of cloth because there was no money to pay the artificers and he did not know if they
would stay together. Colonel Davies ended the letter with "I hope you have funds for
these articles, it is still my duty to inform you of the troops wants."53 The situation was
so bad at the foundry that Colonel Davies implored the Governor to find some assistance
for Captain Anderson. Evidently, his shops were unfinished because the state could not
afford to buy any more siding and his workmen were idle because they lacked nail rod.
To make matters worse, Capt Anderson threatened to resign because his family was
starving since he had no money or supplies.54
It seems that the shortage of money not only affected the pay of the artificers but
also the ability of the state to buy materials for their factories. It was especially evident
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in the repair of muskets. The militia damaged the public arms at such a rate that they
could not be repaired quickly enough to ensure a constant supply.55 The lack of money
compounded this problem because the War Office could not buy the materials needed to
repair them or pay the various smiths. Colonel Davies was acutely aware of the problem
and expressed it in a letter to Governor Benjamin Harrison:
The State is in point of arms in a more defenseless situation at present then at any
period prior to the capitulation of York; and how the grand object of repairing our
arms can be accomplished while the heavy expense of maintaining the
Continental Garrison at York and Hampton is thrown upon the State, I leave to
your Excellency to judge. I know, sir, the censures which would be cast upon my
conduct should the enemy visit us, and our arms be without repairs; and I am
sensible the repairs of our arms cannot be effected for want of money (and
nothing else will do it) so long as the state is encumbered with the heavy expense
of the troops below. 56
It is clear that the lack of money was placing the state in danger. Colonel Davies
was just as afraid for the state as he was for his reputation. Davies, however, was
resourceful and tried to come up with money to aid the factories. He suggested to the
Governor that a few of the public houses that were empty in Richmond be rented out to
raise money for the foundry. He also noted that the private Rope Walk in Richmond was
hiring and the state had a few rope makers that might be hired out for a profit.57 Despite
the War Office's best attempts it could not overcome the chronic shortage of funds.
Finances remained the thorn in the side of the War Office's plans throughout the war.
Even the War Office itself became a casualty to cost cutting as the prospects of peace
improved toward the end of 1782.
55

McBride, "Virginia War Effort," 190.

56

William Davies to Governor Harrison, July 18, 1782, WOLB May 6, 1782- October 12, 1782,
WOR, LV, microfilm reel 633, 84-86.
57

William Davies to Governor Harrison, February 2, 1782, WOLB January 22, 1781 - May 5,
1782, WOR, LV, microfilm reel 632, 12-13.

82

Another issue facing the War Office was competition for the state's supplies and
manpower. Virginia was the warehouse for the entire Southern Department of the
Continental Army. Not only did the War Office supply the State Garrison Regiments, but
it supplied the Continentals in Virginia as well as the Continental Army to the south.
This meant that three different armies were vying for the same supplies and manpower.
Naturally, conflicts arose and the War Office was left to sort them out. A good example
occurred in December of 1780 when the state foundry was in need of nail rod. It also
happened that the continental lab needed nail rod. The Commissioner of War realized
this would create a bidding war for the nail rod and tried to prevent it. Colonel Muter
ordered the state's Commissary of Stores to agree on a price with the Continental
Commissary and then divide the nails. 58 Manpower was also in demand by both the
state and continent. Workmen quickly figured out they could play one off the other for
better wages. The War Office fixed this problem by ordering the State Quarter Master to
adopt the same wages per day as the Continental Quartermaster. 59
The competition for manpower and supplies grew worse as the war progressed
because of invasions and changes in policy. The Continental Congress complicated
matters by adopting a policy of decentralization in its supply chain. The states were
placed in departments which were assigned certain Continental Armies. Since Congress
and the states were cash poor, they directed that the Continental Army be supplied
through provision laws. Virginia had already adopted a provision law to provide supplies
for its troops and the result was that both supply chains were effectively merged.
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Competition for supplies soon grew fierce as the weakness of the new policy was
exposed. When the number of Continental troops in Virginia increased, the War Office
was not able to call on other states to help supply them. 60 The end result of the new
policy was that confusion prevailed as to which stores were under the orders of the
Continent and which were under those of Virginia. For instance, Colonel Muter tried to
collect 200 state-owned cartouche boxes at Petersburg only to find that before his
conductor arrived, Baron Steuben had sent them to the Continental Rendezvous at
Chesterfield Courthouse. 61 With the two supply systems effectively merged, the War
Office's best laid plans were often obstructed by unauthorized seizures and orders of
Continental officers. Colonel Davies, a stickler for the rules, was highly incensed by
these derangements of his plans. In a letter to John Pryor, the State Commissary of
Military Stores, Davies complained:
Major Call honestly told me that he had sent to Potomack to seize the State
accoutrements that were coming on from Philadelphia, Dr. Wilson said all our
medicines that were on their way were seized by somebody and Mr. M Roberts,
your deputy was taking measures to dispose of 2000 stand of arms that were
coming in from the Northward; and all this without the consent or knowledge of
the State and without a single voucher or receipt. If these things are tolerated, I
will at once abandon a situation, where I am held responsible for derangements
and losses that originate totally from the licentious interference of any individual
that pleases. 62
The Commissioner of War was constantly frustrated when people broke in on his
plans by assuming they had the authority to seize supplies. Colonel Davies wrote many
letters trying to deter the various Continental Officers in the state from seizing supplies.
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He admonished them not to supply their troops through unauthorized seizures because it
ruined his calculations, could lead to fraud, and prevented the regular and complete
supply of the Continental Line. 63 It seems many Continental Officers went to great
lengths to ensure their own supply over that of the state's. The Commissioner of War
was livid when he found out that some state arms in a repair shop, along with the armory
tools of the state, were branded with the Continental seal. It appears the Continental
Commissary of Military Stores needed guns and his were damaged, so he seized the
state's arms and by way of apology offered Colonel Davies his damaged ones. The
Commissioner of War refused the damaged arms and demanded the state's arms back
branded or not. 64 Perhaps the biggest Continental offender and thorn in the side of the
War Office was General Weedon in Fredericksburg.
General Weedon had retired from Continental service and was called on by the
Governor of Virginia to lead militia during invasions. Unfortunately for the
Commissioner of War, Weedon wanted to make sure his militia was expertly fitted out to
the detriment of the entire state. On multiple occasions, Weedon took it upon himself to
order the state's arms here and there without consulting the War Office. On August 31,
1781, Davies told Captain Pryor, the Field Commissary of Military Stores, that it was
rumored that Weedon had sent the arms meant for Fauquier County's militia to Orange
County. The Commissioner of War's response to this news was, "I hope to God he has
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not done so."65 That same day, Colonel Davies dispatched a letter to General Weedon
addressing another of his misappropriations of state-owned stores. It seems Weedon had
requested some cavalry stores in Winchester that the Commissioner of War had ordered
from Philadelphia for the Continental Cavalry. Davies wrote:
[It is] very unfortunate you sent to Winchester for Cavalry Equipment because [it]
belongs to [the] state and are allotted to Major Call's Cavalry ....I must beg a stop
may be put to any distribution or appropriation of them, and that you will be kind
enough to inform me where they are, that I may direct their destination according
to the orders of government.66
Weedon's actions were disrupting the plans of the War Office and the
Commissioner of War was becoming increasingly agitated. Colonel Davies believed
Weedon may even have been involved in the Continental theft and branding of the state
arms. Weedon claimed he knew nothing about it, but Davies thought he was trying "to
cover his interferences."67 To make matters worse, Weedon provided a return of arms
delivered to the Northern Neck that fell far short of the number the War Office had
records of his receiving.68 The Commissioner of War eventually suggested prosecuting
General Weedon over the arms he had seized.69
Seizure and misapplication of stores were not the only problems caused by
Continental interference. The Commissioner of War also had to deal with the confusion
caused by orders for supplies. The War Office might order one thing and the Continental
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Quartermaster another. This put the subordinates in the supply chain in a tough position.
They were getting directions from too many leaders which resulted in waste. The chain
of command was quickly splintered when the two supply chains were unofficially
merged. A perfect example occurred in the summer of 1781. The Marquis de Lafayette
was trying to out-run Lord Cornwallis in Virginia and urgently needed boats to cross
rivers. Lafayette wrote to the War Office and others asking for help building boats.
Colonel Davies began receiving complaints about the boats being built from several
different officers. It led him to observe, "I have directed one thing, the Quartermaster
another, the Commissaries a third, and the Marquis a fourth. With respect to the make of
the boats there have been various opinions and everyone undertook to direct."70 The
chain of command was blurring in Virginia and the result was confusion.
Some officers attempted to take advantage of the confusion to get favorable
orders. Colonel Davies had started to use militia exemptions to meet manpower needs in
the Continental and State Quartermaster's Departments, but had issued strict rules on
how and when men were to be exempted. Major Richard Claiborne, the Continental
Quartermaster, applied to Davies for some exemptions, but did not like the War Office's
directions concerning them. Instead of following the rules, Claiborne applied to
Governor Nelson for the same exemptions. Claiborne was taking advantage of the fact
that the Governor had been absent from Richmond and unaware ofDavies's exemption
regulations. 71 Continental interferences and the confusion that resulted made it harder
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for the Commissioner of War to maintain the chain of command and regular supply lines.
It was bad enough that the War Office dealt with competition and interference
from the Continentals, but it also faced the same problems from the local County
Officials. The County Lieutenants and local Commissioners of the Provision Laws were
entrusted with a great deal of autonomy and more often than not abused this authority.
The War Office used circular letters to try to communicate the orders of government to
these officials. The distance from Richmond to some of these counties often meant that
the County Lieutenants had to act on their own before instructions arrived. Many of the
War Office's plans were ruined by County Lieutenants operating in ignorance of the
wishes of government. Some County Lieutenants availed themselves of the public
property to outfit their militia. This was especially true in the case of military stores.
The Fairfax County Lieutenant seized the cartridge boxes meant for the State Garrison
Regiment in September of 1781. Colonel Davies complained that now Colonel Dabney' s
Regiment would have to march to Yorktown without them. 72 In fact, Davies complained
that various County Lieutenants were responsible for seizing over 1200 arms intended for
the use of the regular state troops. 73 The seizure of arms was not the only infraction the
County Lieutenants committed. The War Office was constantly forced to alter its plans
because local officials had taken it upon themselves to issue provisions and clothes
collected under law for the army. The County Lieutenant of Westmoreland issued the
clothing his county had collected before Colonel Davies could have it forwarded to the
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State Clothier. 74 The War Office handled many other interferences and abuses of the
County Lieutenants. When the state's budget crisis worsened in 1782, Colonel Davies
complained to Governor Harrison that many of the County Commissioners refused to
tum in the tax money they had collected. It seems they wanted to keep it on hand in case
expenses arose. They also violated orders buy selling specifics for money and taking it as
their pay, instead of the 10% of the specifics they were allowed. 75 This was a very
serious problem at the time because paper money had been abolished and the Treasury
was virtually empty. The War Office needed the money badly to repair arms.
Despite the problems with the Continentals and local officials, the War Office
was able to take steps to limit their interference. The main weapon at the hands of the
Commissioner of War was communication. He wrote frequent letters to officers and
County Lieutenants with instructions not to issue any supplies unless by the order of the
proper department head. The War Office's most successful campaign to establish
regularity of issues was with clothing. Colonel Davies formulated a clothing plan for
regular spring and winter issues with the help of John Peyton, the Clothier General for the
State.76 With an iron will, Davies insisted on orders from the head of the Continental
Quartermaster's Department that "under no pretence should any of the articles be
appropriated" without express orders from the War Office or Captain Peyton. 77 The
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Commissioner ofWar also went after the County Lieutenants instructing them that "any
supplies received that are property ofthis state cannot be issued without orders from this
office or the Department Head to whom they belong."78 Davies was quick to censure any
County Lieutenant or Commissioner who overstepped his bounds and issued the clothing.
The Commissioner ofWar insisted that the offender replace the clothing and demanded
to know to whom it was issued. Ifthe local official refused, Davies turned the matter
over to the Attorney General to prosecute.79 In this manner, Colonel Davies was able to
establish regularity in the clothing department and Captain Peyton, the Clothier General,
with his tailors at the Albemarle Barracks were able to make regular issues to the various
corps throughout the state.
It appears from the War Office Records that the Commissioner ofWar was
diligent in his efforts to establish regularity ofissues and minimize confusion in the chain
ofcommand. However, the circumstances ofwar and Congress's policy of
decentralization certainly handicapped his ability to do so. The independence oflocal
officials and the interference ofContinental officers also limited the effectiveness ofthe
War Office. Despite these impediments, the War Office was able to keep supplies
flowing to the Continental and State Regiments for which it was responsible.
Absenteeism in the staff departments was another predicament the War Office
had to handle. The staff departments ofthe state suffered a lot ofturnover during the
war. Many times the War Office was left to fill the breach. The Commissioner ofWar
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normally did the duty himself until a proper officer could be found. The post of
Commissary of Military Stores was constantly a problem in early 1781. The original
appointee quit and his replacement, Captain Nathaniel Irish, was ordered to join his
regiment in the Southern Continental Army. Colonel George Muter finally found a
replacement for Irish on February 13, 1781. 80 In the interim, Muter and the Deputy
Quartermaster General, William Rose, were obliged to fulfill the duties normally
associated with that department. 81 When Colonel Davies was the Commissioner of the
War Office, he had to assume the duties of the Commissary of Public Stores William
Armistead. This was especially hard on the War Office because it diverted its attention
from its proper duties. Colonel Davies complained to Governor Nelson that "Mr.
Armistead's long absence has thrown his duties unfairly upon me."82 Unfortunately, both
Commissioners of War were imposed upon by the Commissary of Provision John
Browne. This officer of the state was so neglectful of his duties that even when he was
present, nothing in his department got done. Major Robert Forsyth, the Deputy
Commissary for Purchases of the Southern Continental Army, whose job it was to receive
specifics from John Browne, complained to the War Office that despite repeated requests
he could get no information from him. 83 Colonel Davies answered Forsyth:
You know my opinion of Browne and his management: I see daily less reason to
hope an alteration for the better. Under his guidance there have been immense
misapplications, wastes and irregular issues; that altho' there have been enormous
George Muter to Windsor Browne, February 20, 1781, WOLB January 18, 1781-September 1,
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expenditures for the purposes of the continent, yet vouchers for them are so
irregular and insufficient, that I fear they never will make the continent
chargeable. 84
It took Colonel Davies four months in office to get the Executive to order an enquiry into
the conduct of Browne. Rather than submit to the enquiry, Browne resigned. 85
An even bigger issue for the War Office was the absenteeism of the Governor.
On several occasions, the Commissioner of War was left to fend for himself while the
Governor and the Executive Council were away. During June of 1781, the state was left
without a Governor for nine days while Cornwallis's troops ravaged the countryside all
the way up to Charlottesville. Governor Jefferson's term had ended on the third of June
and Cornwallis's army had forced the Virginia Government to retreat to Staunton.
Colonel Davies was left to maintain the integrity of the war government until Governor
Nelson was elected on the twelfth of June. 86 While Jefferson had been a diligent
Governor, he let others lead the troops in the field. Nelson, on the other hand, assumed
control of the Virginia militia leaving the Executive Council and Colonel Davies to run
the government. While the Governor was away at camp, Colonel Davies could direct the
war effort as he saw fit. It was during the intervals of Nelson's absence from Richmond
that Davies was able to hatch and enforce his militia exemption plan. 87 Governor Nelson
also suffered from an illness that kept him from his duties and rendered him
incommunicado for weeks. Colonel Davies was forced to answer some of Nelson's
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correspondence while the Governor was ill.88 Obviously, the absence of the Governor
placed a hardship on the government, but in Nelson's case, Colonel Davies likely enjoyed
it. He by no means abused his freedom to act. Whenever a piece of business came to the
War Office that would normally require the attention of the Executive, Davies dutifully
wrote to the correspondent that his business would have to wait until Nelson appeared or
enough of the Executive Council was present. 89 The absence of the Governor did hinder
the War Office, but in many ways, as with the militia exemption plan, it gave the
Commissioner of War a free hand in implementing policy.
Another problem the War Office faced was the invasion of the state by the
British. Early in the war, Virginia was spared from invasion, but was compelled to
replace two whole Continental armies. The first army was captured at Charleston in May
1780 and the second was destroyed at Camden in August 1780. On the heels of these
disasters came a major invasion of Virginia in October 1780. A British fleet carrying
General Alexander Leslie and his troops arrived in the Chesapeake Bay and captured
Portsmouth. This invasion marked the beginning of an entire year of enemy occupation
for Virginia. Besides the occupation of Portsmouth, the British made three major raids
into central Virginia reaching as far as Charlottesville. The first raid was Benedict
Arnold's plundering of Richmond in January of 1781 and the second was General
William Phillips drive to Petersburg in April of 1781. The third was Lord Cornwallis's
juncture with Phillips in Petersburg. Cornwallis then drove through Richmond to
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Charlottesville in June of 1781, before retreating to Yorktown in August. Aside from the
obvious depredations of the enemy, these invasions posed a series of problems for the
War Office.
The chief evil of an invasion was the mobilization of the militia. This was
expensive for the cash-depleted Commonwealth and led to a host of other problems.
When the militia was mustered into service, it placed a tremendous burden on the state
for supplies. The troops had to be fed on their way to the general rendezvous and in most
cases armed. The militia was supposed to supply their own arms, but most were too poor
to afford them. This placed the onus of arming them on the state, and, therefore, the War
Office. 90 The Commissioner of War had problems supplying the militia with arms for
several reasons. The irregular distribution and seizure of arms often depleted the stock of
state arms available for the militia.91 Also, a majority of the public arms were in disrepair
from overuse by the militia and the War Office lacked the funds to get them repaired. 92
There were other problems related to militia mobilization as well. The Continental Draft
was based on the militia system. When the militia mustered, the draft and recruitment of
Continental soldiers stopped in those counties. Because Virginia was keeping one
quarter of its militia in the field during 1781, the draft was never completed in many
counties. The constant use of the militia put a huge strain on the resources of Virginia
and disrupted recruiting for the Continental Army. 93 The delay of the draft coupled with
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the depreciation of the bounty money crippled Continental recruiting in the counties.
Since the militia was the backbone of defense in the Revolutionary War, the War Office
was unable to correct any of the evils caused by its use.
The Commissioner of War recognized the problems caused by militia and even
suggested some measures to overcome them. In August 1781, Colonel Davies, fearful of
the militia damaging the public arms while serving with Lafayette, proposed to appoint a
Field Commissary of Military Stores. The Field Commissary's job would be to attend to
the public arms in the militia's hands. 94 Lafayette liked the idea and made a counter
proposal to Colonel Davies, which advocated that any militia turning in bad arms be
required to serve an extra fifteen days. 95 The Marquis allowed Davies to appoint John
Pryor the new Field Commissary ofMilitary Stores, but was frustrated in his attempts to
get longer service for the militia. The appointment of a special officer to oversee the
arms of the militia was only one ofDavies's ideas to fix the problem. In October of
1781, Colonel Davies suggested that captured arms of the British might be sold to the
public. He hoped that if the militia owned their own guns, they would take better care of
them. Colonel Davies proposed that every man with $10,000 in taxable property be
required to buy arms and accoutrements within six months, and men with $5,000 in
taxable property would get a year to buy them. The guns would then be lodged with the
County Lieutenant for the use of the local militia. Davies also proposed stiff penalties for
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those who refused to purchase.96 His plan was not adopted, but it raised awareness of the
problem in the government.
Another problem invasions caused the War Office was the dispersal of its stores
and supplies. When an enemy incursion came through an area, all the military stores and
provisions had to be moved. In the heat of the moment, many decisions were made by
the men on the ground as to where the stores were sent. It was also standard practice not
to gather all of the stores in a single place if it could be helped, as large quantities of
stores would be targeted by the enemy. This dispersal of stores was problematic for the
War Office because it was easy to lose track of which stores were sent where. The
commanders in the field often did not have time to fill out the proper paperwork to notify
the War Office. Colonel Davies often complained that "due to the late incursions many
arms and accoutrements of the state have been dispersed in confusion."97 After Benedict
Arnold's sacking of Richmond, Governor Jefferson and Colonel Muter did not know
where the public arms had been dispersed. Jefferson appealed to Colonel Davies, then
the Continental commander at Chesterfield Court House, for their location. Colonel
Davies's answer speaks volumes to the problem of dispersed stores:
I am surprised your Excellency could conceive I should know where the military
stores of this state were dispersed having had no kind of connexion [sic] with
them, either in point of authority or information. I have, it is true, done
everything to gain intelligence where they have been hid, and am endeavoring to
get them together as well as I can. I was fearful, when I attempted to furnish the
militia with the necessary equipments for the field, that I might be blamed by
them for their very insufficient state, but I always thought I should stand acquitted
before the Executive; who must, I think, by this time, be fully sensible that the
former management of the military stores of this country was never adapted to the
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defense of it. Should it, however, be desired I would not hesitate with the
necessary tools to attempt to put the public arms into a condition, that would not
again expose this country to such disgraces, as it has lately suffered. 98
The public arms were issued to militia and hidden away in so many places that
Jefferson and Muter could get no account of them. When Colonel Davies was appointed
Commissioner of the War in late March, the stores were still in a diffuse state from
Arnold's raid on Richmond. He wrote to Governor Jefferson that the "scattered state of
military stores [is] alarming."99 While Colonel Davies was more equal to the tasks of the
War Office than George Muter, dispersal of stores and supplies remained a problem for
the War Office while the enemy was in Virginia.
Moveable goods and military stores could be dispersed quickly, but the state's
military factories were not so easily moved. As a result of enemy incursions, most of the
factories had to be relocated to the western part of the state. This was a hard lesson that
the War Office learned in early 1781. The principle arms factory of the state was located
seven miles above Richmond at Westham. Unfortunately, Richmond proved vulnerable
to enemy attack when on January 5, 1781, Benedict Arnold's raid up the James River
caught Virginia unprepared and resulted in a devastating blow to the state's military
factories. Arnold's men ravaged the Westham foundry and destroyed the military stores
they found. They burned the boring mill, magazine, ordinance shop, warehouses and the
roof of the foundry. 100 Arnold's unopposed foray up the James reflected poorly on the
Jefferson administration. Not only was the foundry destroyed but many state records,
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including the papers of the War Office, were lost. The Commissioner of War, George
Muter, shouldered the blame for the losses, but it appears he may have been the patsy.
Governor Jefferson should bear the majority of the blame, since he delayed ordering out
the militia, and instead of using expresses to carry the dispatches, he allowed members of
the Assembly to carry the letters back to their counties. This method proved to be too
slow. 101 Thus, when Arnold arrived in Richmond, few militiamen opposed him. The
Commissioner of War cannot be blamed for the late orders, but he was not without blame
for the disaster that was to follow. His culpability was exposed when he could not arm
the militia that did arrive in Richmond. A few days earlier, Jefferson had ordered Muter
to remove the military stores of the state to the south side of the James River. Muter
could not arm the militia on the Richmond side of the river because he had already sent
the arms across. 102 This was a major mistake by the Commissioner of War, who knew
the ill-equipped militia would be called out. While it was necessary to remove the stores
from Richmond as Arnold approached, the Commissioner of War should have anticipated
that the militia would need some arms. As the full extent of the confusion and losses
came to light, it was clear that the military resources of the state were not effectively
organized. The inability to arm the militia caused the loss of the foundry and injured the
ability of the state to supply its armed forces. It would cost Muter his job and
demonstrate the ineffectiveness of the War Office under his direction.
The War Office was faced with another task that would give it troubles
throughout the war. The Commissioner of War, as head of the staff departments, was
responsible for collecting the accounts of the departments so that Virginia could charge
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the Continent for the expense of the war. The Continent was charged for any expenditure
that occurred during invasion and in the process of providing the state's regular quota of
supplies. The War Office Letter Books are full of letters from the Commissioner of War
asking for accounts to be filed so that the Continent could be charged. 103 The quality of
the returns received by the War Office helped determine how well accounts were settled
by the auditors. The problems involved in information gathering definitely affected the
War Office's ability to supply the auditors with good accounts. While this was a
problem, it was not the most serious one. The larger issue the War Office faced was
making sure the staff departments complied with the Continental Regulations for supply.
The Continental Congress issued regulations on supply to provide a check on
unwarranted expenses. The Continental Army kept accounts of what it received and the
State kept accounts of what it issued. When the auditors settled, they tried to reconcile
the two accounts. The Commissioner of War was faced with the problem of ensuring that
the issues of the state were on the Continental Books. This, of course, depended on the
Quartermasters and Commissaries in the field following the Continental and State
guidelines for issuing and receiving supplies. Unfortunately, through incompetence and
neglect of duty many state staff departments failed to issue the proper vouchers and keep
good books. As the War Office tried to put these departments back in order, it
encountered two significant problems.
The first problem was that some state officials were also acting as their
Continental counterparts. This meant that the same person was keeping both books. If
that official was diligent and capable, it was still difficult at best to keep accurate books.
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It appears this was the case for John Robertson, the State Commissary of Issues and the
Deputy Commissary of Issues for the Continental Army. The Commissioner of War
constantly chided Robertson about filing accounts with his superiors in the Continental
service. He also warned Robertson about overlapping his posts because it was causing
waste. 104 John Browne, the head of Virginia's Commissary Department, decided,
without authorization, that he would act for the Continental Army in Virginia as well.
This was an extraordinary occurrence because the properly-appointed Continental
Officer, Major Robert Forsyth, could not get Browne to cooperate with him. In fact,
Forsyth decided to leave Virginia rather than deal with Browne. This left the state
without a proper officer to keep the Continental accounts. Browne acted for both
departments, resulting in the state's being denied many of her credits on Continental
accounts. 105
The War Office's second problem with keeping the State and Continental
accounts balanced was the incompetence and negligence of some state officers. The
worst offender was the Commissary, John Browne. His department was in shambles
from the beginning of the War Office's tenure as the manager of the state's war machine.
Browne elected not to follow the regulations of Congress and, of course, had assumed his
Continental counterpart's duties. Colonel Davies addressed the problem in a letter to the
Governor while making his case for the Commissary's dismissal. Colonel Davies wanted
to "convince Government that we are pursuing a system totally wrong, a system very
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burthensome to the State, and liable to great dispute at settlement with Congress." 10
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Davies enclosed a copy of the Congressional Regulations and observed that Browne had
"thrown this business" into an "entirely different channel" by taking it into his own
hands. Upon consulting with Major Forsyth, Davies found that the credits Virginia had
on the Continental Books did not amount to a "fiftieth part of what she had supplied."

107

Browne's actions damaged the state and created a huge problem for the War Office.
It is alarming that the previous Commissioner of War, George Muter, had not
discovered Browne's actions. The War Office under Colonel Davies attempted to rectify
the problem, but the injury to Virginia had already occurred. While examining the issue,
Colonel Davies discovered that Virginia did not posses a current version of the
Regulations of Congress. The only Congressional Regulations Virginia had received
were those from December of 1780. 108 It seems that while the Virginia government
possessed the Congressional Journals of 1780, no one had extracted the necessary
regulations. Colonel Davies asked Governor Nelson to let him appoint a person to comb
the journals for the regulations pertaining to the various staff departments. He felt that
armed with these regulations, the War Office could set matters straight in the staff
departments. 109
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The Commissioner ofWar issued many instructions to the staff departments to try
to bring them into compliance with the Continental Army's regulations for supply.
Colonel Davies informed John Robertson, the Commissary General of Issues, that he
should only deliver his stores to the Quartermaster & Commissary General ofPurchases'
Departments. Ifhe issued to anyone else, the charges would not appear as a credit on the
Continental Superintendent General ofFinance's books.110 The Commissioner ofWar
implored the staff departments and County Lieutenants to keep proper vouchers but
realized that while the British were in Virginia, irregularities would continue. The
Commissioner ofWar was conscious ofthe irregularities and decided that instructions
alone would not stop irregular issues and accounts. Davies decided that the only way to
get the State and Continental Departments to cooperate in bookkeeping was to call a
conference. He proposed the idea to Major Richard Claiborne, the Deputy Quartermaster
General ofthe Southern Department. Davies reiterated that a conference was needed that
"we may form one uniform system for the future conduct ofthese departments."111 The
Commissioner ofWar hoped that by fostering communication between the department
heads the accounting issues could be solved. The conference, however, could not be held
before the Virginia General Assembly intervened. Virginia's financial situation in 1782
had convinced the Assembly to pass an act forbidding the advancement ofsupplies to the
Continental Army unless specifically requested by Congress or the Financier.112 The
War Office ordered its departments to withhold supplies and refused to supply the
110
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Continental Army unless the Financier sent a letter of credit. Colonel Davies was
mortified because the troops in the field suffered from the law. The Commissioner of
War wrote to General John P. G. Muhlenburg, who was overseeing the Continental
Rendezvous for the new recruits, that Virginia would not supply him unless he could
obtain a letter of credit from the Financier. Davies added that he had already written the
Financier many times for a letter of credit but had not received an answer. 113
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CONCLUSION
The War Office's ability to handle the problems that plagued it during the war
determined its effectiveness. The critical component was the Commissioner of War.
How this gentleman dealt with insurmountable issues decided the degree to which the
problems were limited. The Commissioner ofWar could not be expected to eliminate the
problems caused by lack of funds, enemy invasions, and the autonomy granted to local
officials under the Virginia Constitution. He could, however, find ways to cope with
these issues. The Commissioner of War could be expected to deal with chain of
command issues, irregular seizures, absenteeism and neglect by state officers. The War
Office under the direction ofColonel William Davies was able to combat these problems
to a tolerable degree. Colonel George Muter's War Office, on the other hand, failed to
find a way to manage these problems.
In fact, the evidence points to the ineffectiveness of the War Office under Muter's
command. The single greatest indictment of his tenure was the loss of the War Office
Records during Arnold's Invasion. The primary function of the War Office was to
provide strategic information on the state's ability to wage war, and Muter was careless
with its records. The fragments ofMuter's War Office records show his efforts in
attempting to complete his duties, but they also reveal his lack of proactive thinking. His
mistake with the arms at Westham Foundry offers a perfect example. Muter should have
realized the militia would require some arms. The fact that two months after Arnold's
invasion the military stores and supplies were still in disarray also reflects poorly on the
War Office. Muter's failure to investigate and discover John Browne's incompetence is
another critical mistake. Browne was allowed to assume duties not properly assigned to

him and poorly execute them. This reveals Muter's poor management of the War Office
and clearly illustrates its ineffectiveness. Colonel Charles Harrison, in a letter to General
Steuben on January 12, 1781, summed up the efficacy of the War Office: "Colonel
Muter [was] still at [the] helm and in a perfect lethargy." 1
Colonel Davies's War Office stands in stark contrast to that of George Muter.
The War Office was effective at curtailing many of the problems that afflicted it. Colonel
Davies's War Office overcame the issues of information gathering. He was able to
produce a report to the General Assembly that was insightful and suggested many cures
for the evils that plagued the state's war management. He handled the autonomy of the
County Lieutenants by improving communications with them. Davies made it a point to
constantly inform them of the desires of government. His circular letters are filled with
instructions, prohibitions and advice to the County Lieutenants. Colonel Davies notified
these men that the War Office was watching their conduct by requesting frequent returns,
and he did not hesitate to rebuke them for irregularities. Colonel Davies's creative ideas
allowed the War Office to cope with a lack of funds. While the problem was still
chronic, Davies never gave up trying. He prevailed on troops to wait for payment and
when that failed, offered to pay them with supplies. Davies instructed his factory
managers to take on private work to earn money to buy supplies. He attempted to
discover how to address the issues that affected him. In handling Continental
interference and competition, Davies met the problem head on with the same tactics he
applied to the County Lieutenants. He was watchful and quick to rebuke officers who
strayed from regular channels. Colonel Davies fostered cooperation and better
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communication between the Continental Officers and the State Staff Departments. His
attempts at establishing regularity in the accounts of both are to be lauded. Colonel
Davies seized initiative and acted positively to affect change in the derangements of the
state. His censure and ousting of John Browne represents a glaring example. Colonel
Davies, unlike Muter, was a proactive thinker. His idea to appoint a Field Commissary of
Military Stores to limit the damage the militia did to the public arms provides an
excellent example. Davies was adaptable and little fazed by the fog of war. When the
Governor was absent, he carried on with his duties and even seized the initiative to enact
new policy. The move to militia exemptions instead of pay for workmen illustrates his
command of the situation. Davies's steady hand provided the continuity between the
administrations of Governors Jefferson, Nelson and Harrison.
The War Office was an effective part of Virginia's war time government when it
had an able Commissioner. Muter's tenure adversely affected the defensibility of the
state and caused the troops in the field untoward hardship. Davies's tenure restored the
War Office to effectiveness and aided the troops in the field. The success of the
Yorktown Campaign demonstrates the War Office's effectiveness. It was Davies's
constant efforts to bring down supplies that allowed the French and American Armies to
conduct a proper siege. The fact that so many supplies could be procured from the
country after Cornwallis penetrated it all the way up to Charlottesville shows how able
Davies was in handling the dispersal of supplies and the resulting confusion. John
McBride was correct in his assertion that Davies deserves much of the credit given to
Governor Nelson in the Yorktown Campaign. 2
2
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